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I. INTRODUCTION
N THE LAST DECADES, international transportation of pas-
sengers and goods by sea has increased tremendously. As far
as can be predicted today, international transportation by sea
will increase further in the future. International transportation
leads to contacts among different jurisdictions, and parties to a
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transportation contract are often from different countries. If a
dispute arises between these parties, a claimant often has a
choice between alternative jurisdictions. This choice leads to
uncertainty where future disputes will be resolved. One possible
way to reduce uncertainty and risk is to agree in advance to sub-
mit controversies for resolution exclusively within a designated
forum.1 Such a contractual provision is typically referred to as
an exclusive2 "forum selection", 'jurisdiction", or "choice of fo-
rum" clause.' In maritime contracts, jurisdiction agreements
are common.
4
Even though it sounds very practical to agree in advance
where suit should be brought, a forum selection clause is not
entirely free of problems. Because parties to a transportation
contract might have unequal bargaining power and experience,
one party might try to use a forum selection clause to the disad-
vantage of another party. Therefore the question arises: should
the law protect the party who has, as a result of an exclusive
forum selection clause, waived his or her right to file suit in ac-
cordance with general rules of judicial jurisdiction? Is it neces-
sary to protect passengers against forum selection clauses in
passenger contracts that force them to bring suit far away from
their home jurisdiction? Do businesses entering into contracts
to transport goods by ship need some kind of judicial
protection?
With respect to form passenger contracts and bills of lading,
both questions have been answered by the United States Su-
preme Court in two important recent decisions, Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute (Carnival Cruise)5 and Vimar Seguros y
Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer (Sky Reefer).6 In the former, the
See generally Gary B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 371 (3d ed. 1996). This article will not deal in detail with arbitration
clauses.
2 Two forms of forum selection agreements can be distinguished: exclusive
and nonexclusive forum selection agreements. While the exclusive form requires
that claims be filed only in the contractually determined forum, a nonexclusive
forum selection agreement permits claims in a certain forum without precluding
litigation in other fora. See id. at 454.
3 In the United States, a forum selection clause has to be distinguished from a
choice of law provision. The first designates the proper forum, while the latter
chooses the governing law. See id. at 373.
4 See PETER WErERSTEIN, Jurisdiction and Conflict of Laws Under the New Rules on
Carriage of Goods by Sea, in NEw CARRIAGE OF GOODS By SEA: THE NORDIC AP-
PROACH INCLUDING COMPARISONS WITH SOME OTHER JURISDICTIONS 328 (1997).
5 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
6 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
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Supreme Court upheld a forum selection clause-with the re-
sult that cruise ship passengers residing in the state of Washing-
ton had to bring suit in Florida. In the latter, the Court upheld
an arbitration clause-with the result that a New York fruit dis-
tributor shipping fruits from Morocco to the U.S. on a ship
chartered by a Japanese company had to subject itself to arbitra-
tion in Japan. Both decisions prompted extensive criticism' and
led to proposals to overturn them by statutory provisions. As of
April 2000, however, it seems that only the Sky Reefer decision
may actually be overturned. In any event, if these proposals be-
come reality, the common law rules concerning forum selection
clauses will be superseded by statutory provisions that nullify fo-
rum selection clauses in certain maritime contracts. Therefore,
how future statutes might deal with forum selection clauses is
very important.
This article discusses whether U.S. law with respect to the en-
forceability of forum selection clauses in passenger contracts
and bills of lading should be changed. The first part of the arti-
cle.addresses forum selection clauses in U.S. maritime law. First,
an overview of the contemporary view of U.S. courts regarding
the enforceability of forum selection clauses will be given. Sub-
sequently, the article discusses the Supreme Court decisions,
Carnival Cruise and Sky Reefer;, how lower courts have applied
these decisions; and what proposals have been made in the
United States to overturn these decisions.
7 For criticism of Carnival Cruise, see Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agree-
ments in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform,
67 WASH. L. REv. 55 (1992); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad
Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT'L L. J.
323 (1992); John McKinley Kirby, Consumer's Right to Sue at Home Jeopardized
Through Forum Selection Clause in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 70 N.C. L. REv.
888 (1992); Michael F. Sturley, Strengthening the Presumption of Validity for Choice of
Forum Clauses: Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 23 J. MAR. L & COM. 131 (1992)
[hereinafter Strengthening the Presumption]; Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a
Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum Selection Clauses and the Rehnquist Court, 40
UCLA L. REv. 423 (1992).
For a critique concerning Sky Reefer, seeJoseph C. Sweeney, The Prism of COGSA,
30 J. MAR. L & COM. 543 (1999); Cherie L. LaCour, The Enforceability Of Foreign
Arbitration Clauses Under the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act After Vimar Seguros Y
Reaseguros, S.A. v M/V Sky Reefer, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 127 (1996);
Michael F. Sturley, Bill of Lading Forum Selection Clauses in the United States: The
Supreme Court Charts a New Course, 1996 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 164 [hereinaf-
ter New Course]; Stanley L. Gibson, Sky Reefer Muddies the COGSA Waters, 9 U.S.F
MAR. L.J. 1 (1996); Charles M. Davis, Sky Reefer: Foreign Arbitration and Litigation
Under COGSA, 8 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 73 (1995).
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Because shipping is almost exclusively an international busi-
ness, shipping nations have always recognized that uniformity in
maritime law is desirable. Therefore, international conventions
have been established to achieve this goal. Any new statutory
provision adopted by the United States should consider whether
uniformity in maritime law is a goal and, if so, what kind of solu-
tions the international shipping community has agreed upon.
Moreover, it might be worthwhile to consider approaches taken
by other jurisdictions. The second part of this article therefore
describes solutions that can be found in international conven-
tions concerning maritime law and aviation law, and provides
additional examples of statutory provisions dealing with jurisdic-
tion clauses in European and in German law. These provisions
are interesting insofar as the chosen approach differs from the
approach taken by U.S. law and by international maritime and
aviation conventions.
In light of these examples, the last part of the article process
how U.S. law should deal with forum selection clauses in mari-
time contracts in the future.
II. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN U.S. MARITIME LAW
A. CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF U.S COURTS ON FORUM
SELECTION CLAUSES
Historically, U.S. courts viewed forum selection clauses in do-
mestic and international disputes as per se unenforceable. 8 Fo-
rum selection clauses were seen as agreements to oust the
jurisdiction of courts and therefore as contrary to public policy.
The traditional view, however, changed in the late 1940s,9 and
in 1955, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in
Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line Ltd.10 that the enforce-
ability of a forum selection clause depends upon its
reasonableness.
8 See Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 111 N.E. 678 (Mass.
1916); Benson v. E. Bldg. & Loan Assn., 66 N.E. 627 (N.Y. 1903); Ins. Co. v.
Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 441, 445 (1874) (dealing with the validity of a Wiscon-
sin statute). In Morse, the court held that "agreements in advance to oust the
courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void." Id. at 445. See
generally, Francis M. Dougherty, J.D., Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision
Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th 404, 409-411;
Michael Gruson, Forum Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial
Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 133, 138-140 (1982).
9 Krenger v. Pa. R.R. Co., 174 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1949).
10 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
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The "leading contemporary U.S. case on the enforceability of
forum clauses"11 is the decision of the Supreme Court in The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.12 There, the Court held that a fo-
rum selection clause is prima facie valid and enforceable unless
the party seeking to avoid enforcement shows strong reasons to
set the clause aside. 3 The Bremen involved Zapata, an American
corporation, and Unterweser, a German corporation, that en-
tered into a towage contract, whereby Unterweser agreed to tow
Zapata's oceangoing drilling rig from Louisiana to a point in the
Adriatic Sea off the coast of Italy. According to the agreement,
any dispute arising under the contract was to be resolved in the
London Court ofJustice. During a storm in the Gulf of Mexico,
the rig was seriously damaged. Zapata ordered Unterweser's
ship to tow the rig to Tampa, Fla., the nearest point of refuge.
Thereafter, Zapata sued Unterweser in admiralty in federal dis-
trict court at Tampa. Citing the forum clause, Unterweser
moved to dismiss. The district court denied Unterweser's mo-
tion, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a forum selection
clause is prima facie valid and enforceable absent a strong show-
ing of some reason for setting it aside. The Court discussed sev-
eral reasons why a forum selection clause could be set aside.
First, a defect in the formation of a contract could invalidate a
forum selection clause. Such defects include overreaching, un-
due influence, or overweening bargaining power. 4 Second, a
forum selection clause could be set aside if enforcement of the
clause would be unreasonable and unjust. 5 Finally, the Court
accepted that a court could set aside a forum selection clause
where such a clause "would contravene a strong public policy of
the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute
or by judicial decision." 6 The Court made clear that the party
challenging enforcement bears the burden of proving that a fo-
rum selection clause should be set aside. 17
11 BORN, supra note 1, at 377.
12 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
13 Id. at 10. The Court followed the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 80 (1971).
14 The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12, 15.





The Court named three reasons that support the ruling that
forum selection clauses should be presumptively valid, i" namely
greater certainty in agreements between companies of different
nations, judicial economy, 9 and notions of freedom of con-
tract.20 Moreover, the Court stated that
[T]he expansion of American business and industry will hardly
be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on
a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our
laws and in our courts. .. .We cannot have trade and commerce
in world markets and international waters exclusively on our
terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts. "21
The Court stressed the importance of an arm's-length negotia-
tion by expressly noting that the choice of forum in the contract
between Zapata and Underweser was made in an arm's-length
negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen.22
The Bremen provided a theoretical framework for analyzing the
validity and enforceability of forum selection clauses. But even
though The Bremen was a decision in admiralty law, there was no
certainty as to the question whether forum selection clauses in
all maritime contracts were likewise enforceable. The Bremen
had dealt with a towage contract, which was not regulated by
federal law. Therefore, the holding in The Bremen seemed to be
limited to forum selection clauses in maritime contracts not oth-
erwise governed by federal statutes. The two most prevalent
contracts in maritime law, however, are form carriage con-
tracts23 on passenger vessel tickets and bills of lading2 4-both of
which are regulated by federal law. It was therefore unclear,
whether special statutory provisions in federal maritime law
would make forum selection clauses in these types of contracts
unenforceable. Moreover, the language in The Bremen was rela-
tively broad. It was therefore necessary to refine the The Bremen
holding in order to apply it to other forms of maritime
contracts.
18 Id. at 8-15; see also Jeffrey A. Liesemer, Carnival's Got the Fun ... And the
Forum: A New Look at Choice-Of-Forum Clauses and the Unconscionability Doctrine After
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 53 U. PIrr. L. REv. 1025, 1034-1037 (1992).
19 The Court stated that all courts are overloaded with cases. See The Breman,
407 U.S. at 12.
20 Enforcement of forum selection clauses "accords with ancient concepts of
freedom of contract." Id. at 11.
21 Id. at 9.
22 Id. at 12.
23 46 U.S.C. § 183c (1994).
24 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1994).
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Two important recent decisions of the Supreme Court re-
solved these questions. First, the decision in Carnival Cruise re-
solved the question whether forum selection clauses in form
passenger tickets are enforceable. Second, in the Sky Reefer deci-
sion, the Court decided whether a foreign arbitration clause in a
bill of lading is valid.
1. Form Passenger Contracts: Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
v. Shute
a. The Decision
In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,25 the Court found the
forum selection clause in a form cruise line's passenger ticket
valid and enforceable, designating Florida as the exclusive fo-
rum for all disputes and matters arising under the passage con-
tract. Mr. and Mrs. Shute, residents of the state of Washington,
had purchased passage for a cruise between Los Angeles and
Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. The cruise was operated by Carnival
Cruise Lines, a Panamanian corporation having its principle
place of business in Miami, Florida. The Shutes had purchased
the tickets through a travel agent in Washington. They paid the
fare to the agent who then forwarded the payment to Carnival's
headquarters in Miami, Florida. There, the tickets were pre-
pared and then sent back to the Shutes. The face of each ticket,
at its left-hand lower corner, contained the following admoni-
tion: "SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON LAST
PAGES IMPORTANT! PLEASE READ CONTRACT ON LAST
PAGES 1, 2, 3...
The following appeared on "contract page 1" of each ticket 26:
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF
PASSAGE CONTRACT TICKET
... 3. (a) The acceptance of this ticket by the person or persons
named hereon as passengers shall be deemed to be an accept-
ance and agreement by each of them of all of the terms and con-
ditions of this Passage Contract Ticket....
... 8. It is agreed by and between the passenger and the Carrier
that all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under, in con-
nection with or incident to this Contract shall be litigated, if at
all, in and before a Court located in the State of Florida, U. S. A.,
to the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country....
25 499 U.S. 585 (1991)
26 The ticket is reproduced as an Appendix to the Court's decision. Id. at 605.
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•.. 16. (a) The carrier shall not be liable to make.any refund to
passengers in respect to lost tickets or in respect of tickets wholly
or partly not used by a passenger....
During the cruise, while the ship was in international waters,
Mrs. Shute was injured. The Shutes brought suit against Carni-
val Cruise Lines, Inc. in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington claiming that Mrs. Shutes's inju-
ries had been caused by Carnival's negligence. The district
court granted the corporation's motion for summary judgment,
on the ground that the corporation's contacts with the state of
Washington were insufficient to support the district court's exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction over the corporation. On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed and remanded,2 v ruling that (1) Carnival Cruise Line did
have sufficient contacts with the State of Washington to support
specific personal jurisdiction;28 and (2) it would be unreasona-
ble to apply the forum-selection clause of the ticket contract in
the case at hand. The court of appeals concluded that "because
of the parties disparity in bargaining powee' the application of the
forum selection clause was unreasonable. 29 The court stressed
that the provision was printed on the ticket and presented to the
purchaser on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with no possibility to bar-
gain about the provision. The court distinguished the case from
the facts in The Bremen where two sophisticated parties with
equal bargaining positions had agreed to the clause and each
party had the chance to alter the forum selection provision.
The Supreme Court reversed. Initially, the court stated that,
in examining the reasonableness of a forum selection clause, it
intended to refine the analysis of The Bremen and to account for
the realities of form passenger contracts." The Court looked at
the realities of form passenger contracts and concluded that "it
would be entirely unreasonable to assume that a cruise passen-
ger would or could negotiate the terms of a forum clause in a
routine commercial cruise ticket form.' According to the
Court "common sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a
form contract the terms of which are not subject to negotiation,
and that an individual purchasing the ticket will not have bar-
27 Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 863 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1988).
28 This ruling was affirmed by the Washington Supreme Court. See Shute v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 783 P.2d 78 (Wash. 1989).
29 Shute, 897 F. 2d at 388 (emphasis added).
-0 Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 593.
31 Id. at 593.
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gaining parity with the cruise line. '3 2 Equal bargaining power,
the Court held, is not a necessary requirement for enforcing fo-
rum selection clauses.
The court then considered the reasonableness of a forum se-
lection clause in such a contract. The court looked at the inter-
ests of cruise line companies and identified three reasons why it
would be reasonable for a cruise line company to include a fo-
rum selection clause in a form passenger ticket.33 First, it is
likely for cruise lines to become subject to litigation. Therefore,
cruise lines have a special interest in limiting the possible forum
where suit can be brought. Second, a clause establishing ex ante
the dispute resolution forum has the salutary effect of dispelling
confusion as to where suits may be brought and defended,
thereby sparing litigants time and expense and conserving judi-
cial resources. Finally, the Court stated that passengers benefit
from forum selection clauses in the form of reduced fares that
reflect the savings a cruise line enjoys by limiting the forum in
which it may be sued.
In dicta, the Court stated "forum-selection clauses contained
in form passage contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for fun-
damental fairness."34 But, in the case at hand, the Court found
no indication that the forum selection clause would violate stan-
dards of fundamental fairness. Designating Florida as the forum
in which disputes were to be resolved was not a means of dis-
couraging cruise passengers from pursuing legitimate claims.
Carnival had its principal place of business in Florida, and many
of its cruises departed from and returned to Florida ports. More-
over, there was no evidence that Carnival had obtained respon-
dents' accession by fraud or overreaching.
A second issue was whether the forum-selection clause in the
passage contract violated the Vessel Owner's Liability Act. 5 The
statute provides in § 183c:
It shall be unlawful for the... owner of any vessel transporting
passengers between ports of the United States or between any
such port and a foreign port to insert in any rule, regulation,
contract, or agreement any provision or limitation purporting in
such event to lessen, weaken, or avoid the right of any claimant
to a trial by court of competent jurisdiction on the question of
32 Id.
33 Id. at 593-594.
4 Id. at 595.
35 46 U.S.C. App. § 183c (1988).
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liability for such loss or injury, or the measure of damages
therefor.
All such provisions or limitations contained in any such rule, reg-
ulation, contract, or agreement are hereby declared to be against
public policy and shall be null and void and of no effect. 36
Plaintiffs argued that the forum selection clause does in fact
"lessen, weaken or avoid the right of a claimant to a trial by
court of competent jurisdiction."3" The Court held that "by its
plain language, the forum-selection clause before us does not
take away respondents' right to "a trial by [a] court of compe-
tent jurisdiction ''1 8 and thereby contravene the explicit proscrip-
tion of § 183c. Instead, the clause states specifically that actions
arising out of the passage contract shall be brought "if at all," in
a court "located in the State of Florida," which, plainly, is a
"court of competentjurisdiction" within the meaning of the stat-
ute.39 The Court therefore denied that § 183c renders a forum
selection clause unenforceable and reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
b. Discussion
When the validity of a forum selection clause in a form pas-
senger contract is litigated, two questions normally arise. First,
the court must decide whether the forum selection clause
printed on the back of the ticket or in similar form4" has be-
come a part of the passenger contract, even though the passen-
ger was not aware of the provision. In other words, has the
forum selection clause been incorporated into the contract?
Second, when the forum selection clause has become part of the
contract, whether such a clause is valid and can be enforced. In
Carnival Cruise, the Court did not address the first question, be-
cause the Shutes conceded that the clause was reasonably commu-
36 Id.
37 Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 596.
38 Id.
39 Id. Moreover, the Court rejected the argument that Congress in enacting
§ 183c intended to avoid having a plaintiff travel to a distant forum in order to
litigate. The court ruled that "the legislative history of § 183c instead suggests
that this provision was enacted in response to passenger-ticket conditions pur-
porting to limit the ship owner's liability for negligence or to remove the issue of
liability from the scrutiny of any court by means of a clause providing that 'the
question of liability and the measure of damages shall be determined by arbitra-
tion.'" Id.
40 Often the terms of the contract appear on the second or later page of the
ticket.
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nicated to them. 41 Nevertheless it is important to discuss this
issue here, because one reason why forum selection clauses are
problematic is the way they are communicated to passengers.
The Shutes's concession in Carnival Cruise that the forum se-
lection clause had been reasonably communicated to them was
a reference to a longstanding rule in maritime law, the "reasona-
ble communicativeness test." U.S. courts accept that terms are
incorporated into a contract when they are reasonably commu-
nicated to a party.42 Terms are reasonably communicated to a
party when the ticket sufficiently warns passengers of the provi-
sions. Once the terms and conditions of a ticket contract have
been "reasonably communicated" to the passenger, they are in-
corporated into a contract, regardless of whether or not the pas-
senger has actually read them.43 Similar tickets to those used by
Carnival Cruise Lines have been upheld by courts in the past as
having been reasonably communicated to the passengers.44
Therefore, in Carnival Cruise the only relevant question was
whether a forum selection clause in a form passenger contract is
valid and enforceable. Analyzing the decision of the Supreme
Court, it seems questionable whether the Court was successful in
refining the The Bremen decision to account for realities in a
form passenger contract. The core issue in Carnival Cruise was
whether the interests of consumers or the interests of cruise line
companies should prevail with respect to forum selection
clauses in form passenger contracts. Consumers have an inter-
est in being protected against forum selection clauses in form
passenger contracts that require them to give up their right to
file suit in a state to which the company that is selling the tickets
has sufficient contacts to be subjected to personal jurisdiction.45
Cruise line companies, on the other hand, argue that they
might be subjected to lawsuits in all fifty states and therefore
41 Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 590. A possible way to distinguish a case from
Carnival Cruise is therefore to show that a passenger had no notice of the forum
selection clause.
42 See, e.g., Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 858 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1988); Shan-
kles v. Costa Armatori, 722 F.2d 861 (1st Cir. 1983); Barbachym v. Costa Line,
Inc., 713 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1983). But see Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844
F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988).
43 DeCarlo v. Italian Line, 416 F. Supp. 1136, 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Geller v.
Holland-America Line, 201 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
44 See, e.g., McQuillian v. "Italia" Societa per Azione di Navigazione, 386 F.
Supp. 462, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 516 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1975); Hollander v. K-
Lines Hellenic Cruises, S.A., 670 F. Supp. 563, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
45 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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want to protect themselves in their passenger contracts.46
Which of these contrary interests is given greater weight is, at
the end, a value judgment. The critical aspect of the Carnival
Cruise decision was, however, that even though the Court real-
ized that a form passenger contract is a contract of adhesion,47
and therefore must to be scrutinized more carefully than a
freely reached contract between parties of equal bargaining
power, the Court failed to give any weight in its analysis to the
goal of consumer protection. The Court was therefore not very
sensitive to the concern of passengers in balancing the compet-
ing interests. Instead of appreciating that the existence of a
contract of adhesion is an argument against enforcing a forum
selection clause, the Court seemed to hold that the existence of
an adhesion contract is an argument in favor of upholding the
validity of a forum selection clause. This approach is at least
questionable and was surprising because, in The Bremen, the
Court had not only stressed the fact that the parties were sophis-
ticated businessmen but explicitly distinguished the towage con-
tract from "a form contract with boilerplate language that
Zapata had no power to alter. 48
A contract of adhesion is a standard form contract offered on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis by a party with stronger bargaining
power to a party with weaker power.49 Such a contract is not the
result of bargaining between the parties. Additional characteris-
tics of a contract of adhesion are5 ° that (1) the form has been
drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to the transaction; (2) the
drafting party participates in numerous transactions of the type
represented by the form and enters into these transactions as a
matter of routine; (3) the form is presented to the adhering
party with the representation that the drafting party will enter
into the transaction only on the terms contained in the docu-
ment-this representation may be explicit or may be implicit in
the situation, but it is understood by the adhering party; (4) the
adhering party enters into few transactions of the type repre-
46 In a serious disaster, however, the limitation and concurrent provisions of 46
U.S.C. §§ 183 and 185 would prevent suit in multiple jurisdictions. 46 U.S.C.
§§ 183, 185 (1994).
47 The term was used the first time by Edwin Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-
Insurance Policy, 33 HARv. L. Ruv. 198, 222 (1919)
48 The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-13.
49 Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 600 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50 Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay of Reconstruction, 55 HARv. L.
REv. 1174 (1983).
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sented by the form-few, at least, in comparison with the draft-
ing party; and (5) the adhering party is in practice unlikely to
have read the standard terms before signing the document.
A typical form passenger contract, such as the form passenger
contract in Carnival Cruise, fits this description of an adhesion
contract. A passenger ticket is a contract, drafted by the cruise
line company and used by it as a matter of routine. The passen-
ger is not aware of the standard terms unless the cruise line
sends him the ticket, but then he cannot return the ticket, be-
cause the money paid is not refundable. The passenger there-
fore cannot change the terms of the ticket.
When courts have been required to deal with provisions in a
contract of adhesion, they generally subject such provisions to a
careful scrutiny to determine whether the terms of the contract
are unconscionable.51 It is not unusual for U.S. courts to nullify
provisions of adhesion contracts if unconscionable. Before Car-
nival Cruise, U.S. courts have quite often invalidated forum selec-
tion clauses in adhesion contracts.52  The test of
unconscionability is a two-part test containing procedural and
substantive elements. 53 Gross inequality of bargaining power,
fine-print boilerplate provisions, and lack of knowledge are ele-
ments that can satisfy the procedural element of unconsciona-
bility. The substantive element is satisfied if the contract terms
are unreasonably favorable to one party. The Shutes and Carni-
val Cruise did not have the same bargaining power, and the fo-
rum selection clause was printed in fine-print boilerplate
language. Therefore the question is whether the forum selec-
tion clause was unreasonably favorable to Carnival Cruise Lines.
As already stated the answer to that question is a matter of bal-
ancing the interests of passengers and cruise line companies.
Let us first turn to the interests of cruise line companies.
There is no doubt that it is necessary for cruise lines to use stan-
dard form contracts. For a company selling cruises to thousands
of passengers each year it is necessary and inevitable to use stan-
dardized contracts prepared in advance. There can be no doubt
either that the inclusion of a forum selection clause in every pas-
senger ticket is in the interest of a cruise line. A forum selection
51 See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 3-55.
52 E.g., Colonial Leasing Co. of New Eng. v. Pugh Bros. Garage, 735 F.2d 380
(9th Cir. 1984); Yoder v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va.
1986).
53 Liesemer, supra note 18, at 1038.
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clause reduces juridical risk and transaction costs. 54 The cruise
line does not have to litigate in different fora, which leads to
more predictability as to the outcome of litigation. Cost reduc-
tions result because the cruise line incurs less cost for litigation
in a nearby forum and can rely always on the same local counsel.
It can even be argued that passengers as a whole may benefit
from this cost reduction.
On the other hand, a forum selection clause is at the same
time disadvantageous for passengers who want to file suit. In
the context of an adhesion contract, the passenger has an inter-
est in being protected against oppressive, surprising, or basically
unfair provisions.5 5 By "accepting" an exclusive forum selection
clause, the adhering consumer waives the right to file suit in a
court where the defendant cruise line has sufficient minimum
contacts. Generally a party may agree to waive statutory rights. 5 6
But when a party is not aware of the fact that he is waiving his
right, it can then be persuasively argued that such a provision is
unreasonably favorable to the ship line. The Court failed to bal-
ance these interests in its Carnival Cruise decision. Moreover,
the arguments employed to support the reasonableness of the
forum selection clause are likely to be present whenever an
agreement contains a forum selection clause. Therefore, Carni-
val Cruise will validate almost every forum selection clause.57
Instead of using the The Bremen approach of presuming the
validity of a forum selection clause, which was drafted in the
context of a towage contract between two sophisticated business-
men, the Court could have used the approach for scrutinizing a
contract of adhesion. This approach would have been more
favorable to the Shutes. Under the The Bremen approach, the
Shutes had to rebut the presumption of validity, while under the
unconscionability test, they would have had only to show that
54 See Paul D. Carrington and Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996
SUP. CT. REV. 331, 336 (1996).
55 See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 354.
56 E.g., Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Heflin, 3 S.E. 2d 559 (Ga. 1939); In Re
Cook's Will, 154 N.E. 823 (N.Y. 1926); Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen,
298 P. 705 (Wash.1931); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bibbee, 131 S.E.2d 745
(W. Va. 1963).
57 See Borchers, supra note 7, at 74. "These factors amount to no real limitation
on enforcement. Every large enterprise runs the risk of suits in multiple fora;
every forum selection agreement simplifies the jurisdictional inquiry if enforced;
reduced transaction costs always hold the theoretical possibility of consumer ben-
efit." Id.
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the clause was unreasonable.58 With its decision, the Court
strengthened the position of cruise lines by allowing them to put
forum selection clauses in their form passenger contracts. The
Court likewise effectively narrowed the circumstances in which a
U.S. court will hold a choice of forum clause unreasonable. 59
Neither the adhesive nature of a contract, the unequal bargain-
ing power,60 nor the inability of one party to negotiate the terms
of the contract is a reason to hold that a forum selection clause
is unreasonable. One commentator has noted that Carnival
Cruise holds the promise of turning forum selection agreements
"from instruments of economic freedom to instruments of eco-
nomic oppression."'"
c. The Aftermath of Carnival Cruise
After the decision of the Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise,
two questions arose: first, whether the decision should be over-
turned by amending 46 U. S. C. App. § 183c; and second, how
strictly should lower courts apply the standards set by the Su-
preme Court, especially when the clause designates a forum in a
foreign country as the exclusive forum.
i. Statutory Amendments
Carnival Cruise provoked a flood of criticism and statutory
amendments were proposed to overturn the decision.62 In
58 Judge J. Skelly Wright's statement made in Williams v. Walker Thomas Fur-
niture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-450 (D.C. Cir. 1965), which is reproduced injustice
Steven's dissent, describes quite well the rationale behind the reasonableness
test:
Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of
its terms might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one
sided bargain. But when a party of little bargaining power, and
hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract
with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his
consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was even
given to all of the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the
terms of the agreement are not to be questioned should be aban-
doned and the Court should consider whether the terms of the
contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.
Id. at 449-50 (footnotes omitted).
59 Strengthening the Presumption, supra note 7, at 131.
60 Overweening bargaining power was mentioned explicitly by the Supreme
Court in The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
61 Borchers, supra note 7, at 94.
62 See Michael F. Sturley, Forum Selection Clauses in Cruise Line Tickets: An Update
on Congressional Action "Overruling" the Supreme Court, 24 J. MAR. L & COM. 399
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1992, as part of the Oceans Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 183c was
amended by including the word "any" before the phrase "court
of competent jurisdiction. "63 The relevant part of § 183c then
provided that "it shall be unlawful . . . (2) purporting in such
event to lessen, weaken, or avoid the right of any claimant to a
trial by any court of competent jurisdiction on the question of
liability for such loss or injury, or the measure of damages there-
for." This amendment was intended to overturn the Supreme
Court decision in Carnival Cruise.64 The result of including the
word "any" before the phrase "court of competent jurisdiction"
was that it would no longer be possible for a vessel owner to file
a motion to dismiss an action for improper venue or to transfer
the action to a proper venue, so long as the court had jurisdic-
tion according to general rules of personal and subject matter
jurisdiction.
But in 1993, as part of the Coast Guard Authorization Act, 46
U. S. C. App. § 183c was amended again by replacing "any
court" in clause (2) with "court. ' 65 Even though the Coast
Guard Authorization Act only restored 46 U.S.C. App. § 183c to
the pre 1992 version, the House and Senate differed over the
interpretation of this amendment. The House's section-by-sec-
tion analysis of the Act's provisions stated that the amendment
(§ 309) "should not be construed to mean that a vessel owner
may enforce a forum selection clause in a passenger ticket.
66
Three months later, the Senate rejected this interpretation. Sev-
eral senators explicitly stated that § 309 reinstated the Supreme
Court decision in Carnival Cruise as the applicable law for inter-
preting forum selection clauses and that the House's section-by-
section analysis of the Coast Guard Authorization Act was con-
trary to the intent of the Senate. The senators explained that
they had restored the old version of 46 U.S.C. App. § 183c be-
cause Congress had overturned a Supreme Court decision with-
(1993) [hereinafter Update]; see also, Borchers, supra note 7, at 107-111 (propos-
ing a forum selection statute).
63 Pub. L. No. 102-587, 106 Stat. 5039.
64 139 CONG. REc. 32,038 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1993) (statement of Rep. Studds);
see also Compagno v. Commadore Cruise Line, Ltd., No. 94-1814, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11933, at *5; (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 1994).
65 46 U.S.C. App. § 183c (1994); see also 139 CONG. REc. 31,669 (daily ed. Nov.
22, 1993).
6 139 CONG. REc. 32,040 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1993); see also 139 CONG. REC.
32,038 (daily ed. Nov. 22 1993) ("We do not intend by this amendment to restore
the standard set by the Supreme Court in its 1991 decision, Carnival Cruise Line
v. Shute") (statement of Rep. Studds.)
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out complying with proper legislative proceedings.67 The view
of the Senate prevailed. Courts have considered themselves
bound by the Carnival Cruise decision. 68 But the question re-
mains whether Carnival Cruise should be overturned by a statu-
tory provision.
ii. Application of Carnival Cruise in Lower Courts
After Carnival Cruise, commentators predicted that "dismissal
or transfer of admiralty cases filed outside the chosen forum will
probably be almost automatic, at least in federal court."69 In the
end, they were right. Since Carnival Cruise, courts have generally
enforced reasonably communicated forum selection clauses in
form passenger contracts wherever the passenger is forced to
file suit.70 This is true, even when a United States citizen, who
has bought a ticket in the U.S., has to file suit outside of the
U.S., because the forum selection clause has designated a for-
eign forum as the proper forum. In Carnival Cruise, the Court
held that the Shutes's failed to satisfy their burden of proof to
set aside the forum selection clause on grounds of inconve-
nience, because Florida was not a remote alien forum in which to
67 "While it is perfectly legitimate for the Congress to overturn a Supreme
Court decision within the bounds of the Constitution, we do not believe such
changes should be made without notification to, and careful consideration by,
the Members of Congress responsible for enactment of the legislation. As part of
this consideration, we believe that the interested parties should have an opportu-
nity to comment on any changes. At no time prior to the passage of the Oceans
Act of 1992 was legislation introduced or did the House or Senate hold hearings
on the cruise ship venue concern addressed by section 3006 of the Oceans Act."
140 CONG. REc. 3075 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1994) (statement of Sen. Beaux). See
also, Update, supra note 62, at 399 (stating that the provision was buried in a 68
page act, that there had been no published bill including the provision and no
Congressional Report discussing it, leaving the industry completely surprised and
with no opportunity to oppose the amendment).
6 Compagno, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11933, at *5.
69 Strengthening the Presumption, supra note 7, at 141.
70 Carron v. Holland Am. Line-Westours Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (resident of New York had to litigate in the State of Washington); Perez v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, 993 F. Supp. 39 (D.P.R. 1998) (resident of Puerto Rico had
to litigate in Florida); Amador-Aviles v. Royal Caribbean Cruise, No. 96-2470
(DRD), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9986 (July 2, 1997) (same); Gomez v. Royal Carib-
bean Cruise Lines, 964 F. Supp. 47 (D.P.R. 1997) (same); Igneri v. Carnival
Corp., No. 95 CV 2859, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22484 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (resident of
New York had to litigate in Florida); Colby v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, Inc., 921 F.
Supp. 86 (D.Conn. 1996) (resident of Connecticut had to litigate in Florida);
Melnik v. Cunard Line Ltd., 875 F. Supp. 103 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (resident of the




require the Washington state residents to litigate. 71 This hold-
ing could have been interpreted to mean that the Supreme
Court would consider a foreign alien forum as inconvenient and
therefore unreasonable. Lower courts, however, have consid-
ered remote foreign fora as not inconvenient as well.
In Effron v. Sun Line Cruise, Inc.72, for example, the Court up-
held a forum selection clause in a form passenger contract
designating Athens, Greece as the exclusive forum.v3 The case
involved the purchase of a South American vacation package
from Sun Line Cruises, a New York firm, through a Florida-
based travel agent by Mrs. Effron, a resident of Florida. The
transportation of passengers and baggage was provided solely by
Sun Line Greece Special Shipping Co., Inc, a Greek company.
The purchased ticket informed passengers that the carrier with
whom they were contracting was Sun Line Greece, and the com-
pany's Greek address and phone number were listed on the face
of the ticket. The ticket contained a forum selection clause-
the existence of which was reasonably communicated to Mrs. Ef-
fron-designating Athens, Greece as the exclusive forum. 4
During the cruise, Mrs. Effron was injured as a result of a ship-
board fall. She brought suit against Sun Line Cruises and Sun
Line Greece in New York, where she maintained a second resi-
dence and where Sun Line Cruise did business. The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York refused to
enforce the forum selection clause holding that Mrs. Effron had
met her burden to show that filing suit in Greece would be a
grave inconvenience. The district court stressed the fact that
neither plaintiff, nor the occurrence sued on, had any connec-
tion with Greece. 75 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, however, reversed.
71 Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 594.
72 Effron v. Sun Line Cruise, Inc, 67 F.3d 7 (2nd Cir. 1995).
73 See also Bounds v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 1997 Am. Mar. Cases 25 (C. D. Cal.
1996) (upholding forum selection clause designating Greece as the proper fo-
rum); Mainzer v. Royal Olympic Cruises, Ltd., 677 N.Y.S. 2d 668 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998) (same).
74 The forum-selection provision of the Passage contract, reads as follows:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, any ac-
tion against the Carrier must be brought only before the Courts of
Athens[] Greece to the jurisdiction of which the Passenger submits
himself formally excluding the jurisdiction of all and other court or
courts of any other country or countries which court or courts oth-
erwise would have been competent to deal with such action.
Effron, 67 F.3d at 8.
75 Effron v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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The Court of Appeals held that "a forum is not necessarily
inconvenient because of its distance from pertinent parties or
places if it is readily accessible in a few hours of air travel. '76
Relying on Sky Reefer,77 the court ruled that the costs and difficul-
ties entailed in suing in Greece, "being but the obvious con-
comitants of litigation abroad, do not satisfy The Bremen
inconvenience standard. '7 The court suggested that the prob-
lem of transporting witnesses to Greece might be resolved by a
commission rogatoire, whereby Greek courts may request Amer-
ican courts to take testimony. The court's reliance on Sky Reefer
is questionable because Sky Reefer did not involve a form passen-
ger contract but a form bill of lading. In any event, Effton v. Sun
Line Cruise made clear that Carnival Cruise cannot be distin-
guished by arguing that a foreign forum is less convenient than
a forum within the United States. A distinction between foreign
and domestic fora in determining inconvenience is thus seem-
ingly eliminated. Effron is another example of the recent ten-
dency among U.S. courts to enforce all types of forum selection
agreements, no matter where the forum is located, and no mat-
ter whether such an agreement was concluded between sophisti-
cated businessmen or between sophisticated businessmen and
unsophisticated passenger-consumers.
2. Bills of Lading: The Sky Reefer Decision
The second important contract in maritime law is the bill of
lading.7 9
a. Historical Background
In the United States, bills of lading have been governed by
statute for more than one hundred years. In 1893 Congress en-
acted the Harter Act" to limit the possibility for carriers to in-
clude in their bills of lading liability exemptions. In 1937 the
Harter Act was supplemented with the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act (COGSA), which remains U.S. law with respect to bills of
76 Effron, 67 F.3d at 10. The Court cited Calavo Growers of Calif. v. Generali
Belgium, 632 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concurring).
77 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
78 Effron, 67 F.3d at 10.
7" The three functions of a bill of lading are: A bill of lading acts as a receipt, a
contract of carriage, and a document of title. See WILLIAM TETLEY, MARINE
CARGO CLAIMS 6 (2d ed. 1978).
80 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 190-196 (1994).
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lading."1 COGSA was based on the Hague Rules, a multina-
tional treaty adopted in Brussels in 1924 and ratified by the U.S.
in 1937.82 COGSA applies not only to carriage of goods from
any U. S. port to any other port but also to carriage of goods to
any U.S. port. It limits the ability of carriers to include exemp-
tions from liability in their bills of lading. Section 1303 (8) of
COGSA, like Article 3 (8) of the Hague Rules, reads as follows:
Any clause, covenant or agreement in a contract of carriage re-
lieving the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to
or in connection with the goods, arising from negligence, fault,
or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this section,
or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this chap-
ter, shall be null and void and of no effect.8 3
Cargo owners invoked § 1303 (8) of COGSA to file suit in the
U.S. despite forum selection clauses designating a non-United
States forum. They argued that additional costs of filing suit
abroad (such as traveling expenses or expenses in transporting
expert witnesses there to testify) would effectively lessen the liabil-
ity of defendants and that § 1303 (8) of COGSA invalidates such a
clause.
In Wm. H. Muller & Co., v. Swedish Am. Line Ltd.,84 the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected that argument. The
court held that § 1303 (8) COGSA did not per se invalidate
choice of forum clauses, and that if Congress had intended to
invalidate choice of forum clauses it would have done so ex-
pressly.8 5 The court did not accept the argument that the possi-
bility of incurring increased expenses as a result of the foreign
proceedings was a lessening of liability within the meaning of
§ 1303 (8) COGSA.
But twelve years later, Muller was overruled by Indussa Corp. v.
S.S. Ranborg,16 where the same Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that Muller was inconsistent with COGSA. This time, the court
concluded that COGSA invalidated forum selection clauses in
bills of lading. The court argued that the language of § 1300 of
COGSA indicated that American law must always apply in cases
81 46 U.S.C. app §§ 1300-1313 (1994).
82 See Sweeney, supra note 7, at 559-72.
83 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8) (1994).
84 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955) (involving a bill of lading that required disputes
to be resolved in Swedish courts).
85 Id. at 807.
86 377 F.2d 200 (2d. Cir. 1967); see also Allan I. Mendelsohn, Liberalism, Choice
of Forum Clauses and the Hague Rules, 2J. MAR. L & COM. 661 (1971).
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involving a bill of lading covering an ocean shipment to or from
the United States. The court acknowledged that this provision
does not speak directly to a clause that simply vests a foreign
court with exclusive jurisdiction, but expressed its concern that
a foreign court might apply its own law. The court stated that
"giving effect to such a clause is almost as objectionable as en-
forcing a clause subjecting the bill of lading to foreign law since,
despite hortatory efforts, there would seem to be no way, save
perhaps stipulation by the parties, that would bind the foreign
court in its choice of applicable law."''"
The second argument of the Indussa court was that "from a
practical standpoint, to require an American plaintiff to assert
his claim only in a distant court lessens the liability of the carrier
quite substantially, particularly when the claim is small because
such a clause would put 'a high hurdle' in the way of enforcing
liability."88
Other Courts of Appeals followed the Indussa holding 9 and
extended it to arbitration clauses."0 But in 1995, Indussa was in
turn overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in Sky Reefer.
b. The Sky Reefer Decision
In Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer,9 Bacchus,
a New York fruit distributor, purchased fruits from a Moroccan
fruit supplier. To transport the fruits Bacchus chartered the M/
V Sky Reefer, a vessel owned by a Panamanian company, but
time chartered to a Japanese carrier. The form bill of lading
contained the following contract terms on its back:
(1) The contract evidenced by or contained in this Bill of Lad-
ing shall be governed by the Japanese law.
(2) Any dispute arising from this Bill of Lading shall be referred
to arbitration in Tokyo by the Tokyo Maritime Arbitration Com-
mission (TOMAC) of The Japan Shipping Exchange, Inc., in ac-
87 Indussa, 377 F. 2d at 203.
88 Id. (internal citation omitted).
89 See Conklin & Garrett, Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose, 826 F.2d 1441 (5th Cir. 1987);
Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981);
Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. The M/V "Steir," 773 F. Supp. 523 (D.P.R.
1991); Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, (8th Cir.
1986).
90 See State Establishment for Agric. Prod. Trading v. M/V Wesermuende, 838
F.2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1988); Siderius, Inc. v. M/V "Ida Prima," 613 F. Supp. 916
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Pac. Lumber & Shipping Co. v. Star Shipping A/S, 464 F. Supp.
1314 (W.D. Wash. 1979).
91 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
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cordance with the rules of TOMAC and any amendment thereto,
and the award given by the arbitrators shall be final and binding
92on both parties.
During shipment, the cargo was damaged. The fruit distribu-
tor was compensated in part from its marine cargo insurer,
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros. Both then brought suit against the
M/V Sky Reefer in rem and the Panamanian owner in per-
sonam in District Court in Massachusetts under the bill of lad-
ing, contending that the arbitration clause was invalid under
COGSA. The district court granted the carrier's motion to stay
the action and compel arbitration.9" It then certified for inter-
locutory appeal the question of whether the provisions of § 1303
(8) COSGA nullifies an arbitration clause contained in a bill of
lading governed by COGSA. The First Circuit held that the arbi-
tration clause was enforceable.9 4 The court assumed that a for-
eign arbitration clause lessens liability under COGSA, but
resolved the conflict with § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), which requires courts to stay proceedings and enforce
arbitration agreements in favor of the FAA.95
The Supreme Court affirmed, but differed from the reason-
ing of the Court of Appeals by holding that COGSA does not
render a forum selection clause invalid. The Court thus not
only answered the narrow question of whether § 1303 (8)
COGSA nullifies an arbitration clause in a bill of lading, but also
rejected the entire Indussa holding.96 The Court gave two rea-
sons for its rejection. First, the Court drew a clear distinction
between the lessening of liability and the increase of transaction
costs of litigation. It ruled that § 1303 (8) of COGSA addresses
92 Id. at 531.
93 Vimar Seguros y Reaseguro, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, No. 91-13345WF, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5672, at *21 (D. Mass. April 19, 1993).
94 Sky Reefer, 29 F.3d 727 (1st Cir 1994).
95 The FAA provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such
suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such
suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agree-
ment, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the
terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not
in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
96 Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 534 ("We cannot endorse the reasoning or the conclu-
sion of the Indussa rule itself.").
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only the lessening of the specific liability imposed by the Act,
without addressing the separate question of the means and costs
of enforcing that liability. 7 According to the Court "[tihe dif-
ference is that between explicit statutory guarantees and the
procedure for enforcing them, between applicable liability prin-
ciples and the forum in which they are to be vindicated."98
Second, the Court stressed the meaning of uniformity in the
interpretation of a statute based on a multilateral treaty. Be-
cause none of the parties to the "Hague Rules" had interpreted
them to prohibit forum selection clauses, the Court declined to
construe the provision in a different way.99 The argument of the
plaintiff that arbitrators in Japan would apply the Japanese ver-
sion of the Hague Rules, in a manner less advantageous to plain-
tiffs, was rejected by the Court, concluding that the district court
has retained jurisdiction over the case and "will have the oppor-
tunity at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legiti-
mate interest in the enforcement of the . . . laws has been
addressed."1 00
c. Decisions After Sky Reefer
The question remaining after Sky Reefer was whether lower
courts would apply the holding to forum selection clauses as
well. Cargo claimants have urged lower courts to restrict the
holding of Sky Reefer to foreign arbitration clauses.1"' However,
it was sufficiently clear from the holding of the Supreme Court
that the Court intended to overrule Indussa not only with re-
spect to arbitration clauses but with respect to forum selection
clauses in general.10 2 Federal courts have therefore not hesi-
tated to apply Sky Reefer not only to arbitration clauses, 10 3 but to
97 Id.
98 Id.
9 Id. at 536-37 (citing Michael F. Sturley, International Uniform Laws in National
Courts: The Influence of Domestic Law in Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 VA. J. INT'L L.
729, 776-96 (1987)).
10 Id. at 540.
10, See Elizabeth A. Clark, Foreign Arbitration Clauses and Foreign Forum Selection
Clauses in Bills of Lading Governed by COGSA: Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v.
M/V Sky Reefer,1996 BYU L. REv. 483; Gibson, supra note 7, at 3, 22-26.
102 Justice O'Connor only concurred in the judgment, because she declined to
reject the Indussa rule without qualification. In her opinion it was only necessary
to overrule Indussa "to the extent necessary to decide this case." Sky Reefer, 515
U.S. at 542.
103 Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995);
Morewitz v. West of England Ship Owners Mut. Prot. and Indem. Ass'n (Luxem-
bourg), 62 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 1995); Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 913 F. Supp.
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foreign forum selection clauses in bills of lading governed by
COGSA. 104
The extension of Sky Reefer to forum selection clauses in bills
of lading governed by COGSA, however, raises two questions.
Section 1300 of COGSA provides that U.S. law must always apply
in cases involving a bill of lading covering an ocean shipment to
or from the United States. 10 5 Commentators have questioned
whether foreign courts will apply COGSA at all or, if they do,
whether they will do so in the same way as a U.S. court.1 0 6
The majority in Sky Reefer rejected the second argument by
describing it as an "insular distrust of the ability of foreign tribu-
nals to apply the law."'1 7 This statement captures the essence of
the second argument. Foreign courts, like U.S. courts, are re-
quired to apply foreign law regularly. Nobody would ever con-
clude that U.S. courts are not able to deal with foreign law.
Such an argument undermines the whole concept of conflicts of
law. In maritime law, an area that is harmonized to a remarka-
ble extent by the Hague Rules and where often specialized
courts for maritime law are designated as the proper forum, 1 8
the argument sounds even worse. Moreover, courts can use the
help of expert witnesses to make sure that they apply U.S. law in
the same way as U.S. courts.'0 9 Whether foreign courts will
properly apply U.S. law should not really be a concern.
826 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. M.V. Egasco Star, 899 F.
Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
104 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. M.V. DSR Atlantic, 131 F.3d 1336 (9th Cir.
1998); Mitsui & Co. (USA) v. Mira M/V, 111 F.3d 33 (5th Cir. 1997); Hyundai
Corp. U.S.A v. M/V An Long Jiang, No. 92-C3855, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 254
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1998); TradeArbed, Inc. v. M/V Agia Sofia, No. 96-C4930, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23001 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 1997); Seven Seas Ins. Co. v. Danzas S.A.,
1997 Am. MAR. CASES 961 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Bison Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. M.V. Per-
gamos, No. 89-C1392, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22067 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Great Am.
Ins. Co. v. Kapitan Byankin, 1996 Am. MAR. CASES 2754 (N.D. CALF. 1996); Pasz-
tory v. Croatia Line, 918 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Va. 1996); Int'l Corp. v. M/V Cast
Muskox, No. 95-C41841, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18200 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1995).
105 In addition, § 1312 provides that "It]his chapter shall apply to all contracts
for carriage of goods by sea to or from the ports of the United States in foreign
trade." 46 U.S.C. § 1312 (1994).
106 See Clark, supra note 101, at 497.
107 Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at. 539 (with respect to foreign arbitrators); see alsoJus-
tice Moore' s concurring opinion in Indussa, 377 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1967)
(describing the majority opinion as "outlawing any other tribunal than our
own.").
108 Like courts in England which have long experience in admiralty litigation.
109 Even within the United States, there is no absolute uniformity as to the
interpretation of COGSA, Michael F. Sturley, Proposed Amendments to the Carriage of
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The first question-whether U.S. law will be applied at all-
seems to be more important. Even though the Hague Rules
have harmonized the law governing bills of lading, the law in
this area is not totally standardized. For example, the limits of
liability can differ significantly. 110 The Sky Reefer court resolved
the problem with respect to arbitration clauses by concluding
that the District Court has retained jurisdiction over the case
and "will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage
to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the
S.. laws has been addressed." '11 However, asJustice O'Connor
pointed out in her concurring opinion, this is not true with re-
spect to choice of forum clauses.' 1 2
One possible solution accepted by the Fifth Circuit in Mitsui
& Co. (USA), Inc. v. MIRA M/Vis that a choice of forum clause is
supplemented by a choice of law clause designating U.S.
COGSA as the applicable law." 3 The court of appeals held that
in such a case there is no risk that U.S. COGSA will not be ap-
plied. This conclusion is not entirely correct because the appli-
cation of U.S. COGSA depends on the question whether the
foreign court will enforce a choice of law clause. Therefore the
party filing a motion to dismiss the case because of improper
venue should be required to show that a choice of law clause will
be enforced in the designated forum. If this can be shown,
there is no reason to refuse the enforcement of a forum selec-
tion clause by a U.S. court.
The situation is more difficult when a forum selection clause
in a bill of lading designates a foreign forum and foreign law will
be applied. This would be the case either (1) because the bill of
lading does not contain a choice of law provision and the choice
of law rules of the designated forum do not designate U.S.
COGSA as the applicable law, or (2) because the bill of lading
contains a choice of law clause that does not select U.S. COGSA
as the applicable law. The Supreme Court held in Sky Reefer that
it is not necessary that COGSA itself is applied by the foreign
Goods by Sea Act, 18 HOUSTONJ. INT. L. 609, 613 n.22 (1996) [hereinafter Proposed
Amendments]. Therefore small deviations in the interpretation of the law are no
argument.
110 See Mendelsohn, supra note 86, at 665.
1- 515 U.S. at 540.
112 Id. at 542.
113 Il F.3d 33, 37 n.4 (5th Cir. 1997). This solution was already taken into
consideration by the Indussa court, "there would seem to be no way, save perhaps
stipulation by the parties, that would bind the foreign court in its choice of applica-
ble law." 377 F.2d at 203 (emphasis added).
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court, but the "[r] elevant question.., is whether the substantive
law to be applied will reduce the carrier's obligations to the
cargo owner below what COGSA guarantees.""' 4 In other words,
"a COGSA-like result must be reached."' 1 5
This approach is reasonable so long as maritime law is rela-
tively uniform. It would not make a lot of sense to render a
forum selection clause unenforceable by arguing that a foreign
court will not apply U.S. COGSA even though it applies rules
that are equivalent to U.S. COGSA." 6 However, uniformity in
maritime law with respect to bills of lading is shrinking. Conse-
quently, U.S. courts examine foreign maritime law with respect
to a specific case. This leads to additional litigation. Therefore
the question has to be asked whether under the current ap-
proach a forum selection clause in a bill of lading can still fulfill
the task of reducing uncertainty concerning jurisdiction.
So far, the question whether the foreign substantive law to be
applied will reduce the carrier's obligations to the cargo owner
below what COGSA guarantees has not been litigated heavily.' 17
In some cases, the court did not have to perform the corre-
sponding analysis 118 because the plaintiff did not prove that the
applicable substantive law reduces the obligations of the defen-
dant below what COGSA guarantees.' 1 9
u4 515 U.S. at 539.
115 Gibson, supra note 7, at 26.
116 Other commentators argue that because COGSA governs as a matter of law
it should never be acceptable to apply foreign law, even if the applicable foreign
law is identical to U.S. COGSA. Id. at 27.
117 A situation where foreign substantive law will reduce the carrier's obliga-
tions to the cargo owner below what COGSA guarantees can arise when the for-
eign law has incorporated the Visby-Amendments to the Hague Rules. Even
though the Visby-Amendments have increased the liability limits, they decrease a
carrier's responsibility in some cases in contravention of the Hague Rules. See
William Tetley, Limitation, Non-Responsibility and Disclaimer Clauses, 11 MAR. LAW-
VER 203, 225 (1986).
118 But see The Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. M/V Coral Halo, No. 99-1242,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1548 (E.D.La. Feb.11, 2000) (containing analysis of Japa-
nese and U.S COGSA). Ironically, in some instances the forum selection clause
may allow the application of the Visby Amendments, which have limits and terms
of liability more favorable to cargo owners than the Hague Rules and U.S.
COGSA.
119 Jewel Seafoods Ltd. v. M/V Peace River, 39 F. Supp. 2d 628 (D.S.C. 1999)
(concerning forum selection clause designating the People's Republic of China
as the exclusive forum); Asoma Corp. v M/V Southgate, No. 98-C7407, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18974. (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (concerning forum selection clause designat-
ing Korea as the exclusive forum).
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In Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. M/V. DSR Atlantic,120 the District
Court for the Northern District of California held that because
Korean law did not allow suit against a vessel in rem, the plain-
tiff would be denied a right to pursue its statutory remedies.
Therefore, the district court refused to enforce the forum selec-
tion clause in a bill of lading and denied appellants' motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals, however,
reversed, ruling that "the mere unavailability of in rem proceed-
ings does not constitute a 'lessening of the specific liability im-
posed by COGSA, rather it presents a question of the
means... of enforcing that liability."' 121
d. Discussion
The important policy issue underlying the cases dealing with
forum selection clauses in bills of lading is whether it is per-
ceived as necessary to protect cargo owners against exclusive fo-
rum selection clauses designating a foreign forum. The foreign
forum in most cases is the place where the carrier has his princi-
pal place of business. The Indussa court obviously found it nec-
essary in 1967 to protect cargo owners and used § 1303 (8)
COCSA as a tool to reach this goal by ruling that forum selec-
tion clauses lessen the liability of carriers. Sky Reefer therefore
had to address the issue whether the wording of § 1303 (8)
COGSA supports the holding that arbitration and forum selec-
tion clauses lessen the liability of a carrier.
A textual interpretation of § 1303 (8) COGSA and the identi-
cal Article 3 (8) of the Hague Rules, however, do not support
the Indussa holding. The wording of § 1303 (8) of COGSA ad-
dresses the lessening of liability of the carrier and not about the
lessening of the amount of damages the cargo owner can re-
cover after deducting litigation expenses. Countries that have
ratified the Hague Convention and where the legislature
thought it necessary to protect the interests of cargo owners
have therefore adopted special provisions in their versions of
COGSA specifically to render forum selection clauses invalid. 122
120 131 F.3d 1336 (9th Cir. 1998).
121 Id. at 1339-40 (quoting Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 537).
122 For example, § 9(2) of the Australian Sea Carriage of Goods Act (1924)
provides:
Any stipulation or agreement, whether made in the Common-
wealth or elsewhere, purporting to oust or lessen the jurisdiction of
the Court of the Commonwealth or of a State in respect of any bill
of lading or document relating to the carriage of goods from any
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The Supreme Court therefore correctly refused to accept that
expenses incurred for litigation and arbitration abroad "lessen
the liability" of a carrier. In light of the fact that U.S. courts in
many areas already construe COGSA in a way that is different
from the international understanding of the Hague Rules, 123 it
is to be welcomed that the Court stressed the importance of uni-
form interpretation of an international convention like the
Hague Rules.
The crucial question remains: was the Indussa court correct in
its assessment that cargo owners should be protected against ex-
clusive forum selection clauses designating a foreign forum. In
light of Carnival Cruise and Effron, it is clear that no argument
can be made that such clauses are unreasonable or against pub-
lic policy. Courts will therefore not declare such clauses unen-
forceable. Hence, if it is perceived that the Sky Reefer solution is
inadequate, the law must be changed by the legislature.
Initially one could argue that cargo owners are sophisticated
businessmen 1 4 and that there is no reason to protect them at
all. But looking at the realities of the carriage of goods by sea,
one might have doubts whether this position is correct. A con-
tract of carriage is concluded between a carrier and a shipper.
After receipt of the goods from the shipper, the carrier presents
a standardized bill of lading. 25 The carrier regularly includes in
the bill of lading an exclusive forum selection clause designating
a forum in the country where the carrier has his principal place
of business. 126
The bill of lading acts as a receipt, a contract of carriage, and
a document of title. 127 The shipper forwards the bill of lading to
place outside Australia to any place in Australia shall be illegal, null
an void, and of no effect.
UN-Doc., TD/B/C.4/ISL/6, at 112. See also Proposed Amendments, supra note 109,
at 658.
123 See Proposed Amendment, supra note 109, at 611-13.
124 See Sky Reefer, No. C.I.V.A.91-13345, 1993 WL 137483, at *3 (D. Mass. 1993)
("Plaintiff [Bacchus] is evidently neither unsophisticated and unfamiliar with the
negotiation of maritime shipping transactions, nor a party of relatively weak bar-
gaining power.") (Judge Wolf); see also Carman Tool & Abrasives v. Evergreen
Lines, 871 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that shippers and cargo under-
writers are sophisticated people).
125 Some argue that standardized bills of lading are in fact adhesion contracts.
See Gibson, supra note 7, at 9; see also Sky Reefer, 29 F.3d at 731 n.4 (indicating that
a maritime bill of lading might be an adhesion contract).
126 See "CONLINE" bill of lading of the Baltic and International Maritime Con-
ference, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/ISL/6 Annex 3 at 14.
127 See Tetley, supra note 79.
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a bank, which acts as an agent for the consignee. In exchange
for forwarding the bill of lading, he receives either cash or a bill
of exchange. 121 Once the shipper has received his money, he
will not have any interest in suing the carrier because loss and
damage of goods are now the risk of the consignee.1 29 The con-
signee receives the bill of lading from his bank in exchange for
the money owed to the bank and a commission. When the
goods arrive at the port of discharge and some damage has oc-
curred, the forum selection clause is therefore disadvantageous
only to the consignee1 30 who did not participate in the negotia-
tion or conclusion of the contract with the carrier. If the carrier
is not willing to compensate the consignee for the damage that
occurred, in practice-and in the presence of a forum selection
clause-the consignee must file suit at the place where the car-
rier has his principal place of business. The fact that so many
bills of lading contain an exclusive forum selection clause
designating the principal place of business of the carrier as the
exclusive forum is an indication that consignees obviously have
no bargaining power to change the terms in bills of lading.
Cargo owners advance the argument that the costs involved in
litigation abroad are so high, especially when the damage is rela-
tively low, that a forum selection clause designating a foreign
forum effectively bars the recovery of damages. Moreover, the
necessity to retain a foreign lawyer and to translate documents
places additional hurdles in the way of enforcing liability
abroad."' Additionally, litigation abroad leads to practical
problems. In cases where damage occurred in connection with
the loading or unloading of goods, proof is best available at the
forum of the port of loading or discharge, which in most cases is
not the principal place of business of the carrier.13 2
On the other hand, litigation abroad does not always have to
be more expensive than inside the United States. U.S. claimants
sometimes have much higher litigation expenses within the
United States than abroad. The court provided the example
128 For an explanation of the operation of documentary credits, see PAUL
TODD, BILLS OF LADING AND BANKERS' DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1993).
129 It is therefore questionable whether it is necessary to be concerned about
the inequality of bargaining power between the shipper and the carrier, asJustice
Stevens expressed in his dissent in Sky Reefer 515 U.S. at 550.
130 Jfirgen Basedow, Das forum conveniens der Reeder im EuGVU, IPRAx 133
(1985).
131 Id. at 134.
132 See Wetterstein, supra note 4, at 329.
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that for a claimant in Seattle, travel expenses to Vancouver are
lower than to New York. 133 Counsel fees can sometimes be
lower abroad, litigation can be faster, and in many countries the
winning party can recover litigation expenses. Moreover, the ar-
gument that the high costs of litigation abroad will prevent
cargo owners from enforcing their rights is only true when the
cargo was not insured. If the cargo was insured, as most mari-
time cargo is, the cargo owner recovers from the insurance com-
pany. The insurance company most likely is, or should be,
accustomed to litigation abroad.
1 34
In addition, the interests of carriers should also be taken into
account. During a voyage, a vessel often has contact with several
seaports. Without a forum selection clause, the carrier is sub-
jected to the risk that he has to litigate in different fora. To be
sure, carriers have, or should have, lawyers in all ports where
they load or unload. But in any case, the answer to the question
whether it is necessary to protect only cargo owners is not an
easy one. As a result, new legislative initiatives in the United
States are now recommending greater protection of cargo
owners.
e. Legislative Initiatives: The Proposed New U.S. Senate
COGSA '99
In 1993, the U.S. Maritime Law Association (MLA) started to
work on a draft for a new U.S. COGSA, which was presented to
the public in 1996.131 In particular, the provisions of the MLA
proposal concerning forum selection clauses have been dis-
cussed fiercely among U.S. and foreign lawyers 13 6 and has called
forth much concern by a number of organizations interested in
133 Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. at 536.
134 See Soo Sandrajin Lee, Is Sky Reefer in Jeopardy? The MLA's Proposed Changes
to Maritime Foreign Arbitration Clauses, 72 WASH. L. REv. 625, 646 (1997).
135 The progress of the proposed legislation is documented by William Tetley,
The Proposed New United States Senate COGSA: The Disintegration of Uniform Interna-
tional Carriage of Goods by Sea Law, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 595 (1999); Proposed
Amendments, supra note 109; Michael F. Sturley, Uniformity in the Law Governing the
Carriage of Goods by Sea, 26J. MAR. L. & COM. 553 (1995).
136 See Regina Asariotis & Michael N. Tsimplis, The Proposed U.S. Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, 1999 LMCLQ 126; Michael F. Sturley, Proposed Amendments to the
U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: A Response To English Criticisms, 1999 LMCLQ 519;
Regina Asariotis and Michael N. Tsimplis, Proposed Amendments to the U.S. Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act: A Reply To Professor Sturley's Response, 1999 LMCLQ 530; Tetley,
supra note 135, at 620-22. For a discussion of the original MLA draft, see Soo
Sandra Jin Lee, supra note 134, at 643 and Proposed Amendments, supra note 109 at
613.
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the shipping industry. 3 7 With respect to the question of validity
and enforceability of forum selection clauses in bills of lading,
the MLA draft provided the following:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement made before a claim has
arisen that specifies a foreign forum for litigation or arbitration
of a dispute governed by this Act shall be null and void and of no
effect if:
(i) the port of loading or the port of discharge is or was in-
tended to be in the United States; or
(ii) the place where the goods are received by a carrier or the
place where the goods are delivered to a person author-
ized to receive them is or was intended to be in the
United States;
provided, however, that if a clause, covenant, or agreement made
before a claim has arisen specifies a foreign forum for arbitration
of a dispute governed by this Act, then a court, on the timely
motion of either party, shall order that arbitration shall proceed
in the United States. 138
The MIA proposal has been presented to the U.S. Senate's
Sub-Committee on Surface Transportation and Merchant
Marine and has been amended several times. It is not clear
which version is most likely to prevail. The latest draft known as
"Senate COGSA '99" is dated as of September 24, 1999.' With
respect to forum selection clauses, Senate COGSA '99 provides
in § 7 (i) (2) the following:
"Notwithstanding a provision in a contract of carriage or other
agreement to which this subsection applies that specifies a for-
eign forum for litigation or arbitration of a dispute to which this
Act applies, a party to the contract or agreement, at its option,
may commence such litigation or arbitration in any appropriate
forum in the United States if one or more of the following condi-
tions exist:
i) The port of loading or the port of discharge is, or was
intended to be in the United States, or
ii) The place where the goods are received by a carrier or
the place where the goods are delivered to a person au-
137 Concern has been expressed by BIMCO, FIATA, the International Group of
P & I. Clubs, the International Shipping Group and the European Commission.
See Regina Asariotis and Michael N. Tsimplis, Proposed Amendments to the U.S. Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act: A Reply To Professor Sturley's Response, 1999 LMCLQ 530,
532.
1.38 MLA draft proposal, reprinted in Sturley, supra note 107, at 662-83.
139 William Tetley, "Staff Working Draft of Senate COGSA 99" at http://www.
admiraltylaw.com/tetley/cogsa99.html (Sept. 24, 1999) [hereinafter COGSA 99].
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thorized to receive them is, or was intended to be in the
United States, or
iii) The principal place of business or, in absence thereof,
the habitual residence of the defendant is in the United
States, or
iv) The place where the contract was made is in the United
States, or
v) A forum specified for litigation or arbitration under a
provision in the contract of carriage or other agreement
is in the United States.
The MLA proposal and § 7 (i) (2) of COGSA '99 have the ef-
fect that, notwithstanding an exclusive forum selection clause in
a bill of lading designating a foreign forum, both parties to the
contract can nevertheless file suit in the United States. The re-
quirements are that the contract must have certain connections
with the United States. The practical result of both provisions is
that if one party files suit in the U.S. and the other party, relying
on the exclusive forum selection clause, files a motion to dismiss
because of improper venue, a U.S. court must deny the motion.
The motion must be denied because the U.S. is a proper forum
under the legislation in spite of the exclusive forum selection
clause in the bill of lading. Both proposals therefore overturn
the Sky Reefer decision.
The difference between the MILA proposal and the U.S. Sen-
ate COGSA '99 is that U.S. COGSA '99 specifies additional cir-
cumstances that open U.S. courts to a plaintiff. Moreover, the
MLA proposal renders a forum selection clause null and void,
while U.S. Senate COGSA '99 does not have this effect. The
plaintiff can still file suit according to the contractually desig-
nated forum. An existing exclusive forum selection clause
therefore becomes in fact a permissive forum selection clause.
In practice, however, a U.S. plaintiff will most probably use the
options provided by Senate COGSA '99.
To declare a forum selection clause null and void has the re-
sult that a foreign judgment would not be enforceable in the
United States because the foreign court lacks jurisdiction ac-
cording to U.S. standards. 4 ' This problem is resolved in the
U.S. COGSA '99 proposal. Because U.S. COGSA '99 does not
declare the United States as being the exclusive jurisdiction, a
foreign judgment can be enforced in the United States. This
140 See Asariotis & Tsimplis, supra note 137, at 138; see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113 (1985); Mercandino v. Devoe & Raynolds, Inc., 436 A.2d 942 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
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approach is reasonable. The interests of cargo owners are pro-
tected in U.S. COGSA '99 by giving them the option to file suit
in the United States. This goal can be reached without making
foreign judgments unenforceable. U.S. COGSA '99 is therefore
the better proposal.
Another concern expressed by commentators was that a U.S
judgment in breach of a foreign jurisdiction agreement might
not be enforceable abroad. 4 ' This may be true and can lead to
practical difficulties. However, the question whether cargo own-
ers should be protected against forum selection clauses and
whether U.S. courts should have jurisdiction can not depend on
whether a U.S. judgment is enforceable abroad. Moreover, and
specifically in maritime law, a judgment against a carrier can
often be enforced in rem against a vessel which lies in a U.S.
port. In any event, the MLA proposal and U.S. Senate COGSA
'99 protect the interests of U.S. cargo claimants who can file suit
in the United States, despite an exclusive forum selection agree-
ment designating an exclusive foreign forum.
The foregoing has outlined the current state of U.S. law with
respect to forum selection clauses in form passenger contracts
and bills of lading. With respect to both maritime contracts, fo-
rum selection clauses are generally accepted by courts in the
United States. If Senate COGSA '99, however, becomes reality,
the result will be that cargo owners are protected from exclusive
forum selection clauses in bills of lading covering transportation
to or from the U.S. while passengers are not. Neither the MLA
proposal, nor Senate COGSA '99, nor any other statutory initia-
tive proposes to revive the amendments made in the 1992
Oceans Act with respect to passenger contracts and overturn
Carnival Cruise.
Before a final evaluation of the current U.S. law and the cur-
rent propositions of the MLA and Senate COGSA '99 will be
made, this article will attempt to put the current U.S. law and
the current proposals in an international context to examine
what kind of solutions can be found in other jurisdictions and in
international conventions concerning transportation law.
141 See Asariotis & Tsimplis, supra note 137, at 139.
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III. AN INTERNATIONAL VIEW ON FORUM
SELECTION CLAUSES
Examining international conventions in transportation law
and the law in other jurisdictions, it can be stated that the ap-
proach toward forum selection clauses in general and in mari-
time law in particular differs from the current U.S. approach.
A. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS IN TRANSPORTATION LAW
Transportation is an international business. It has therefore
always been recognized that uniformity in transportation law, es-
pecially in maritime and aviation law, is desirable. In both areas,
international conventions have been established to achieve the
goal of uniformity. Conventions in maritime and aviation law
have influenced each other. Therefore, this article discusses not
only international maritime conventions, but also international
conventions in aviation law. Moreover, aviation law is important
because an argument can be made that transportation of pas-
sengers and goods by sea or by air is not so fundamentally differ-
ent as to justify different approaches in both areas with respect
to forum selection agreements.
1. International Conventions Concerning The Carniage of
Passengers And Goods By Air
In aviation law there is a long tradition of multilateral treaties
designed to develop uniform rules governing air transportation
in an international setting. The principal piece of legislation on
international aviation law is the Warsaw Convention, 4 2 adopted
in 1929 and ratified by the United States in 1934.143 The War-
saw Convention governs the liability of air carriers for accidents
in international carriage by air. According to Article 1 (1), the
Convention applies to "all international transportation of per-
sons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire ... [and]
equally to gratuitous transportation by aircraft performed by an
air transportation enterprise. 144 The Convention introduced
uniform rules with respect to transportation documentation-
142 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, 49 U.S.C. app. § 40105 (1994) (adherence of the United
States proclaimed Oct. 29, 1934).
143 For the history of the Warsaw Convention, see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, AVIA-
TION LAw CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1981); see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld &
Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV.
497, 499 (1967).
144 49 U.S.C. § 40.05 (1994).
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such as passenger tickets, baggage checks, and air waybills; the
duties and rights of contracting parties; and a statute of limita-
tions. Moreover, the Convention specifically defines in which
fora suit can be brought. The right of the plaintiff to file suit in
one of these fora cannot be restricted before the damage oc-
curs. 45 With respect to the rules of jurisdiction, the Warsaw
Convention makes no difference between passenger contracts
and contracts for the transportation of goods.
Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention provides four op-
tions where a plaintiff may bring an action for damages: (1) the
domicile of the carrier; (2) the carrier's principle place of busi-
ness; (3) the carrier's place of business through which the con-
tract for travel was made; or (4) the place of destination. 146 One
possible forum was not mentioned in this list, the passenger's
domicile or permanent residence (the so-called "fifth forum").
The result was that U.S. citizens sometimes had to file suit in
foreign courts even though the carrier involved had sufficient
contact with the United States to be subjected to personal juris-
diction in the United States. Commentators were not the only
ones who perceived this result as unfair.147 The U.S. govern-
ment was equally concerned that the system would be disadvan-
tageous to U.S. citizens. It was argued that because special
conditions of U.S. litigation make it more favorable for a U.S.
plaintiff to file suit in the United States than abroad,1 4' a U.S.
plaintiff should have the ability to file suit in the United States.
145 "Any clause contained in the contract and all special agreements entered
into before the damage occurred by which the parties purport to infringe the
rules laid down by this convention, whether by deciding the law to be applied or
by altering the rules as to jurisdiction, shall be null and void." Id. Agreements that
provide additional fora where the plaintiff can file suit are, however, possible. See
Allan I. Mendelsohn, The Warsaw Convention and Where We Are Today, 62J. AIR L.
& COM. 1071, 1076 (1997); Warren L. Dean,Jr., Restructuring the Warsaw Right to
Recover, 1089 Aviation Law Reports § 23,904 (1996).
146 For a detailed analysis of Article 28, see James L. Baudino, Venue Issues
Against Negligent Carriers-International and Domestic Travel. The Plaintiffs's Choice?,
62J. AIR L. & COM. 163 (1996).
147 See Allan I. Mendelsohn, A Conflict of Laws: Approach to the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 33J. AIR L. & COM. 624, 630 (1967); Dean supra, note 145.
148 The following factors make U.S. courts attractive for plaintiffs. Juries of lay
men and women are often remarkably pro-plaintiff. Moreover, procedural as-
pects of U.S. litigation tend to favor the plaintiff. Such pro-plaintiff aspects in-
clude: the availability of contingency fee arrangements; the fact that unsuccessful
litigants are not ordinarily liable for their adversary's attorneys' fees; the broad
discovery proceedings in the U.S.; and U.S. damage awards, which tend to be
dramatically higher than those in other countries. See Born, supra note 1, at 4; see
also Lee S. Kreindler, The IATA Solution, 14 LLOYD'S AVIATION L. 6 (1995) (stating
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The first international convention in transportation law that
provided something similar to the fifth forum was a maritime
convention, the "International Convention for the Unification
Of Certain Rules Relating To Carriage Of Passengers' Luggage
By Sea" from 1967.149 Article 13150 specified exclusive fora that
could be designated by a forum selection agreement prior to the
occurrence of the incident that causes the loss or damage. One
accepted forum was the Court of the State of the domicile or per-
manent place of residence of the claimant if the defendant had a
place of business and was subject to jurisdiction in that State. 151
Using Article 13 (1) (c) of the Brussels luggage convention as
a model, an initial attempt to include the fifth forum into the
Warsaw system was made in the 1971 Guatemala Protocol. 52 A
second attempt was made in the 1975 Montreal Additional Pro-
tocol No. 3.153 But neither protocol ever went into force. On
May 28, 1999, however, the United States signed the "new" War-
that "frequently venue is more important in determining damages than the sub-
stantive law applied"); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Postscript and Warning, 21 AIR &
SPACE L. 187, 188 (1996).
149 International Convention For The Unification Of Certain Rules Relating
To Carriage Of Passengers' Luggage By Sea, Brussels, May 27, 1967 [hereinafter
Luggage Act] reprinted in BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, at 2-50 (rev. 7th ed. 1993). See
Mendelsohn, supra note 86, at 667.
150 Article 13 contains the following provision:
Prior to the occurrence of the incident which causes the loss or
damage, the parties to the contract of carriage may agree that the
claimant shall have the right to maintain an action for damages,
according to his preference, only before:
1) the Court of the permanent residence or principal place of
business of the defendant, or by the Court of the place of
departure or that of destination according to the contract of
carriage; or
2) the Court of the State of the domicile or permanent place of
residence of the claimant if the defendant has a place of busi-
ness and is subject to jurisdiction in that State.
Any contractual provision that restricts the claimant's choice ofju-
risdiction beyond that permitted under paragraph (1) shall be null
and void.
Luggage Act, supra note 149, at 2-53, 54.
15, The 1961 luggage convention is phrased in a unique fashion, suggesting
that if a carrier includes a choice of forum clause in its form ticket, that clause
must provide the passenger with a choice among the listed fora. But Article 13 of
the luggage convention does not appear to require the carrier to include a
choice of forum clause in its ticket. Id.
152 Protocol To Amend The Convention For The Unification of Certain Rules
Relating To International Carriage by Air Signed At Warsaw on October 12, 1929,
ICAO Doc. 8932.
153 Id.
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saw Convention, the 1999 Montreal Convention.154 Article 33
(1) of "Montreal 1999," provides the plaintiff the option of su-
ing in one of the Article 28 (1) fora of the Warsaw Convention.
In addition, Article 33 (2) provides: "in respect of damages re-
sulting from the death or injury of a passenger, an action may be
brought... in the territory of a State Party in which at the time
of the accident the passenger has his or her principal and perma-
nent residence and to or from which the carrier operates services
for the carriage of passengers by air, either on its own aircraft or
on another carrier's aircraft pursuant to a commercial agree-
ment, and in which that carrier conducts its business of carriage
of passengers by air... "I If goods have been damaged, the fifth
forum is not available. Like the jurisdiction provisions in the
1929 Warsaw Convention, the jurisdiction provisions in Mon-
treal 1999 cannot be restricted by agreement. 15 6
Thus, with respect to passenger transportation by air it is now
internationally accepted that a passenger should have the op-
tion to file suit in the country where he has his principal and
permanent residence if the carrier has certain contacts with that
country. Such a solution balances the interests of passengers
and carriers. Passengers can file suit where they live but only if
the carrier does business there. This requirement avoids carri-
ers being subject to jurisdiction in a fora with which they have
no connection at all.
2. International Conventions Concerning The Carriage of
Passengers And Goods By Sea
In maritime law, as in aviation law, there is a long tradition of
multilateral treaties designed to develop uniform rules gov-
erning maritime transportation in an international setting. Un-
like in aviation law, however, there exist different conventions
concerning the carriage of passengers and the carriage of
goods.
154 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, signed at Montreal on 28 May 1999.
155 Id. (emphasis added). Principal and permanent residence is defined in Art
33 (3) (b) as "the one fixed and permanent abode of the passenger at the time of
the accident. The nationality of the passenger shall not be a determining factor
in this regard." Id.
156 Article 49 of the Montreal Convention states: "Any clause contained in the
contract of carriage and all special agreements entered into before the damage
occurred by which the parties purport to infringe the rules laid down by this
Convention, whether by deciding the law to be applied, or by altering the rules as
to jurisdiction, shall be null and void." Id.
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a. International Maritime Conventions Concerning the
Carriage of Passengers By Sea
In an attempt to create a "Warsaw Convention" for the car-
riage of passengers by sea, two conventions have been drafted so
far. Neither has received the same acceptance as the Warsaw
Convention and neither has been signed or ratified by the
United States. They did not fail to gain acceptance, however,
because of their jurisdiction provisions. Rather the liability lim-
its were perceived as far too low. 15 7 But the solutions, which can
be found in both conventions with respect to forum selection
agreements, were generally acceptable at the time the conven-
tions were drafted.
In 1961, the Comite Maritime International (CMI) presented
the first international convention concerning the carriage of
passengers: the "International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating To The Carriage of Passengers by Sea"
(Brussels Convention 1961)."5 This so-called Brussels Conven-
tion 1961 was the maritime equivalent of the 1929 Warsaw Con-
vention and was colloquially known as "Little Warsaw." But with
respect to jurisdiction, the 1961 Brussels Convention differed
from the 1929 Warsaw Convention. Unlike Article 28 of the
Warsaw Convention, "Brussels 1961" did not specify certain fora
where, at the option of the plaintiff, suit could be filed. The
only provision with regard to jurisdiction in "Brussels 1961" was
157 According to Article 6 of the Brussels Convention Relating To The Carriage
of Passengers by Sea, the liability of the carrier for the death of or personal injury
of a passenger shall in no case exceed 250,000 francs (approximately US $
16,600). According to Article 7 (1) of the 1974 Athens Convention, the liability
of the carrier for the death of or personal injury to a passenger shall in no case
exceed 700,000 francs (approximately US $ 45,000) per carriage. In 1990, the
liability limits of the Athens Convention were raised to 175,000 Special Drawing
Rights (approximately US $ 175,000). See Protocol to Amend the Athens Con-
vention Relating to the Carriage Of Passengers And Their Luggage By Sea,
London, March 29, 1990, reprinted in BENEDICT ON ADMmALTry, doc. 2-3A, at 2-
22.7.
158 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, doc. 2-1 at 2-2 (rev. 7th ed. 1993). The scope of
the convention was defined in Article 2, which stated that the Convention applies
to any "international carriage" if either the ship flies the flag of a Contracting
State or if, according to the contract of carriage, either the place of departure or
the place of destination is in a Contracting State. International carriage was de-
fined as carriage in which according to the contract of carriage the place of de-
parture and the place of destination are situated either in a single State if there is
an intermediate port of call in another State, or in two different States.
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Article 9, which declared all forum selection and arbitration
clauses in passenger contracts to be "null and void."' 59
The shipping nations of the world 160 did not ratify "Brussels
1961," reportedly because they believed that a convention con-
cerning the carriage of passengers should deal with luggage as
well. 16  But even when a luggage convention was drafted in
1967162, none of the shipping nations ratified it. Therefore, the
1961 Brussels Convention and its Article 9 are today only of his-
torical interest.
In 1974, on the basis of the existing CMI conventions, the In-
ternational Maritime Organization (IMO)1 63 convened a confer-
ence in Athens to create a uniform liability regime in the area of
the carriage of passengers and their luggage. The result of the
conference was the "Athens Convention Relating to the Car-
riage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea of 1974. '' 164 The
Athens Convention took a different approach than the Brussels
Convention with respect to forum selection provisions. Like the
Warsaw Convention, "Athens 1974" provided several options for
the plaintiff to file suit while declaring invalid any provision that
restricted the options by contract.1 65 The options of the claim-
ant were specified in Article 17 (1),166 which provided that, if
the Court is located in a State Party to the Convention, the
claimant has the option to file suit in (a) the Court of the place
of permanent residence or principal place of business of the de-
fendant, (b) the Court of the place of departure or that of the
destination according to the contract of carriage, (c) a court of
the State of the domicile or permanent residence of the claim-
ant, if the defendant has a place of business and is subject to
jurisdiction in that State, or (d) a court of the State where the
159 Article 9 states that "Any contractual provision ...purporting to require
disputes to be submitted to any particular jurisdiction or arbitration, shall be null
and void, but the nullity of that provision shall not render void the contract
which shall remain subject to the provisions of this Convention." Id.
16 The convention is in force only in ten countries.
161 ROLF HERBER, SEEHANDELSRECHT 37 (1999).
162 Luggage Act, see supra note 149, at 2-53.
163 While the Comite Maritime International is a private organization situated
in Antwerp, the International Maritime Organization (www.imo.org), situated in
London, is a special organization of the United Nations. IMO was originally
called the Inter-Governmental Consultative Organization (IMCO), but the name
was changed in IMO in 1982.
-64 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, doc. 2-2 at. 2-9.
165 Article 18: "Any contractual provision ... having the effect of restricting the
option specified in paragraph 1 of Article 17, shall be null and void." Id. at 2-17.
166 Source on file with the author.
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contract of carriage was made, if the defendant has a place of
business and is subject to jurisdiction in that State. Article 17
(2) of the Convention allows forum selection and arbitration
clauses, after the occurrence of the incident that has caused the
damage. "Athens 1974" has been in force since April 1987.167
So far, twenty states are parties.1 6
If Article 17 (1) of "Athens 1974" would have the same world-
wide acceptance as the Warsaw Convention, and if it would have
been applicable in U.S. courts, the outcome in Effton v. Sun Life
Cruise, Inc. would have been different. Mrs. Effron could have
brought suit in the United States. Assuming that U.S. courts
would construe Article 17 (1) of the Athens Convention in the
same way they have construed Article 28 (1) of Warsaw, the con-
tract between Mrs. Effron and Sun Line Greek would have been
deemed to have been made in the United States, most probably
in New York through the offices of Sun Line Cruises. The New
York office would have been "a place of business through which
the contract was made," '69 and, consequently, where Sun Lines
Greek would have been subject to U.S. jurisdiction. 170 Moreo-
ver, Mrs. Effron had her domicile or permanent residence in
the United States. Accordingly, under Article 17 (1) of "Athens
1974," she could have brought suit in the United States.
Because the places specified in Article 28 of Warsaw have
been construed by courts (like the places specified in provisions
like Article 17 (1) of "Athens 1974") to refer to the Contracting
Parties, not to specific areas within a particular Contracting
Party, the country's internal law and not the Convention gov-
erns the plaintiffs choice of forum within that country."'
Where in the United States Mrs. Effron could have brought suit
would therefore be a question of U.S. procedural law. Most im-
portantly, no matter what the result might be, Mrs. Effron would
167 See Summary of Status of Conventions at http://www.imo.org/convent/sum-
mary.htm. (Sept. 30, 2000).
168 Herber, supra note 161, at 40.
169 It seems reasonable to construe Article 17 (1) (d) in the same way as Article
28(1) of the Warsaw Convention was construed in Eck v. United Arab Airlines,
Inc., 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1966). The court held that a foreign airline had acted
as an agent of United Arab Airlines and the United States was sufficient to be a
place where the contract was formed. See Baudino, supra note 146, at 173.
170 Athens Convention, Art. 17 (1)(d).
171 Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc, 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965) (stating that
"the U.S. certainly did not indicate that it understood that the Warsaw Conven-
tion would have any impact upon the rules governing the choice of forum within
the federal system, or among the various states.").
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have been protected against being required to file suit in
Greece. It is difficult to understand why passengers on cruise
lines should be treated differently from passengers on airplanes.
In a case like Carnival Cruise, however, a ratification by the
U.S. of a convention like "Athens 1974" might well not change
the outcome of the case. As already mentioned, the plaintiffs
choice of forum within a country is governed by the internal law
of that country, not by the Convention. Therefore, even if a
convention like "Athens 1974" were in force in the U.S., cruise
line companies like Carnival could still include forum selection
clauses in their passenger tickets designating Florida as the ex-
clusive forum, because the internal law of the U.S. presumably
enforces such clauses. Moreover, the fact that the plaintiff has
the option under the convention to file suit in several specified
fora may not change this conclusion. By waiving his right to file
suit in fora other than the forum specified in the exclusive fo-
rum selection clause, the plaintiff does not waive a right given to
him by the convention. The participation of the United States
in an international convention like "Athens 1974" would thus
not necessarily protect passengers like Mrs. Shute from exclusive
forum selection clauses designating a forum within the United
States.
b. International Maritime Conventions Concerning The
Carriage of Goods By Sea
In the area of the carriage of goods by sea, three international
conventions exist: the "Hague Rules",1 12 the "Visby Amend-
ments" to the Hague Rules, 7' and the "Hamburg Rules." '174 The
goal of all three conventions is to create uniformity in maritime
172 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relat-
ing to Bills of Lading, adopted at Brussels, August 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No.
931, 120 L.N.T.S 155, reprinted in BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, doc. 1-1 at 1-2.1 (rev.
7th ed. 1993). For the history of the Hague Rules, see Michael F. Sturley, The
History of COGSA and the Hague Rules 22,J. MAR. L. & COM. 1 (1991) [hereinafter
History of COGSA].
173 Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, adopted at Brussels, February
23, 1968, reprinted in BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY doc. 1-2, at 1-25 (rev. 7th ed. 1993).
174 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, adopted at
Hamburg, March 31, 1978, reprinted in BENEDICT ON ADmIRALTY, doc. 1-3, at 1-32.6
(rev. 7th ed 1993).
The Hague Rules and the 1968 protocol were criticized especially by develop-
ing countries, which felt that both conventions did not reflect their interests.
Therefore, the United Nations Commissions on International Trade Law (UNCI-
TRAL) worked out a detailed study and drafted a new convention that was
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law because a lack of uniformity imposes costs on the shipping
industry. 175 The United States has ratified only the Hague
Rules 176 and has adopted them as the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act. 1
77
Neither the Hague Rules nor the Visby Amendments contain
provisions dealing with jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ac-
knowledged this in Sky Reefer by holding that § 1303 (8) COGSA,
a provision identical to Article 3 (8) of the Hague Rules, does
not invalidate forum selection clauses because such clauses do
not lessen the liability of carriers. 178 Hence, uniformity concern-
ing jurisdiction was not a goal of the Hague Rules or the Visby
Amendments. The issue of whether forum selection clauses
were enforceable was simply left to national law.179
However, a different approach was taken when the Hamburg
Rules were drafted. The Hamburg Rules were drafted as a reac-
tion to criticism-in particular by developing countries- that
the Hague Rules and the Visby Amendments were too favorable
to carriers. With respect to forum selection agreements, repre-
sentatives of most developing countries expressed their view that
the Hamburg Rules should restrict the enforceability of forum
selection agreements.8 0 The reason for this position was that
adopted at a conference at Hamburg. SAMIR MANKABADY, INTERNATIONAL SHIP-
PING LAW II 29 (1991).
175 See Michael F. Sturley, Uniformity in the Law Governing the Carriage of Goods by
Sea, 26J. MAR. L. & COM., 553, 558 (1995) [hereinafter Uniformity].
176 For a discussion on the reasons that the United States ratified only the
Hague Rules, see Allan I. Mendelsohn, Why The U.S. Did Not Ratify the Visby Amend-
ments, 23 J. MAR. L. & COM. 29 (1992). For an overview which countries have
ratified the Hague Rules, the Visby Amendments, and the Hamburg Rules, see
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, doc. 1-3A at 1-57.
177 See Mendelsohn, supra note 176, at 23.
178 See id. at. 25-7.
179 Proposed Amendments, supra note 109, at 657.
180 Report of the Working Group on International Shipping Legislation on its
Second Session, U.N. Doc.TD/B/C.4/ISL/8. "The representatives of most devel-
oping countries stated that considerable loss and hardship was caused to their
cargo interests by the insertion of unfair jurisdiction clauses .... The representa-
tives of a few developed market economy countries felt that cargo owner should
be free to choose the law and venues of litigation." Id. For the Canadian point of
view, see, William Tetley, Canadian Comments on the Proposed Uncitral Rules: An
Analysis of the Proposed Uncitral Text, 9J. MAR. L. & COM. 251, 252 (1978), "Canada
is a nation of importers and exporters, of shippers and consignees, but not a
carrier nation in ocean trade." Id. He describes the jurisdiction provisions in the
UNCITRAL proposal as useful to both cargo interests and carriers and as an ad-
vantage to Canadian business that, at present, can be forced to go to an unfavora-
ble forum in a distant country. Id. See also William Tetley, The Hamburg Rules-A
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most developing countries did not have a shipping fleet to im-
port and export their goods. Rather, they relied on foreign flag
vessels. These countries were therefore interested in protecting
all consignees whether shippers or consignees. On the other
hand, countries that carried most of their goods on their own
ships, favored rules allowing forum selection agreements.
The view of those countries seeking to protect consignees
from forum selection clauses prevailed. Article 21 (1) of the
Hamburg Rules specifies fora where the plaintiff at his option
can file suit. The plaintiff has the option to file suit in: (a) the
principal place of business or, in the absence thereof, the habit-
ual residence of the defendant; (b) the place where the contract
was made provided that the defendant has there a place of busi-
ness, branch, or agency through which the contract was made;
or (c) the port of loading or the port of discharge. In addition
to these options, Article 21 (d) allows permissive forum selec-
tion clauses by stating that the plaintiff has the option to file suit
in any additional place designated for that purpose in the con-
tract of carriage by sea. Article 21 (3) prohibits proceedings in a
place not specified in Article 21 (1) and (2). Article 23 pre-
cludes the circumvention of Article 21 by stating that any clause
that deviates directly or indirectly from the provisions of the
Convention is null and void.
If the United States had ratified the Hamburg Rules, plaintiffs
in Sky Reefer, Mitsui & Co. (USA), or Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. could
have started arbitration or brought suit in the United States be-
cause the port of discharge was situated in the United States.
Senate COGSA '99, § 7 (i) (2) basically adopts Article 21 of
the Hamburg Rules. The plaintiff is given the option to file suit
in the United States despite an exclusive forum selection clause
if the carriage of goods by sea has certain connections with the
United States. Article 21 of the Hamburg Rules designates from
a global perspective certain fora where suit can be brought and the
reasons why the designated forum is a proper forum (Article 21
(1) (c) for example states that the place where the port of dis-
charge is situated is a proper forum). Section 7 (i) (2) deter-
mines from a U.S. perspective when the United States is a proper
forum (for example when the port of discharge is situated in the
United States). This is simply a different way to describe the
same result.
Commentary, LLOYD'S MAR.CoM. L.Q. 1, 8 (1979) (stating without substantiation
that Article 21 "is a codification of the best jurisprudence".)
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However, while Article 21 names only four reasons why suit
can be filed in a certain fora, section 7 (i) (2) adds the place
where the goods are received by a carrier or the place where the
goods are delivered to a person authorized to receive them as
reasons to file suit in the United States. This provision presuma-
bly has been included because U.S. COGSA '99 not only covers
transportation by sea, but intermodal transportation in general.
In addition, unlike Article 21 of the Hamburg Rules, COGSA
'99 designates the United States as a proper forum merely if the
contract were made in the United States, and even if the defen-
dant does not have a place of business, branch or agency in the
United States.18 '
3. Different Regimes
Comparing the international conventions in maritime and
aviation law, three different regimes with respect to forum selec-
tion clauses can be identified. First, there are conventions that
are silent with respect to forum selection clauses. Such conven-
tions do not deal with the choice of forum question at all, like
the Hague Rules and the Visby Amendments, but instead leave
the question of where a suit can be filed entirely to the national
law of the contracting parties. Second, there are conventions
that are forum selection clause averse. Such conventions de-
clare forum selection clauses invalid, like the Brussels Conven-
tion relating to the Carriage Of Passengers By Sea. Finally there
are conventions that contain forum selection clauses specifying
a number of fora among which the plaintiff might choose. Ex-
amples of such conventions include the Athens Convention, the
Hamburg Rules, and the Warsaw and the Montreal Conven-
tions. For a plaintiff this third solution is most advantageous as
his or her rights cannot be restricted by contract, and suit can
always be filed in one of the specified fora.
The favored approach today is obviously the last approach
mentioned, that is to give a plaintiff the option to file suit in
several fora, specified by a convention. This is true for the trans-
portation of goods and passengers. With respect to passenger
transportation, there is a general understanding that passengers
should be able to file suit in their home jurisdictions, i.e., their
domiciles or permanent places of residence.
181 See COGSA 99, supra note 139.
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B. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW AND
GERMAN LAW
While provisions in international conventions have an impact
on the United States insofar as these conventions are already
U.S. law or may become U.S. law in the future, provisions with
respect to jurisdiction clauses in the law of the European Union
and in Germany obviously do not have the same impact on the
United States. Nevertheless, this article will describe the law in
both places concerning jurisdiction clauses as examples of dif-
ferent approaches toward jurisdiction clauses. Both EU law and
Germany law draw a distinction between consumer contracts
and non-consumer contracts.
1. The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
In 1968, the European Community adopted the Convention
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgements in Civil and
Commercial Matters (Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction).182
One goal of the convention was to harmonize the law concern-
ing "direct jurisdiction" within the member states of the Euro-
pean Community, now the European Union.
a. The basic rules concerning forum selection clauses
The basic rule ofjurisdiction established by the Convention is
that defendants domiciled in a Contracting State are to be sued
in the courts of their state of domicile.18 3 As an exception to
this basic rule, Article 17 of the Brussels Convention deals with
the permissibility of agreements on jurisdiction. Article 17 (1)
provides:
If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Contracting
State, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Contracting
182 See consolidated and updated version of the Brussels Convention of 1968
and the Protocol of 1971 following the 1989 accession of Spain and Portugal,
1990 O.J. (C184) 33, 34 [hereinafter Bussels Convention on Jurisdiction], re-
printed in EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND ENFORCE-
MENT OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS, 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990).
See also WILLIAM W. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION 143-50 (1995); PETER
BYRNE, THE EEC CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGE-
MENTS 23-103 (1990); ALAN DASHWOOD, A GUIDE To THE CIVILJURIsDICTION AND
JUDGMENTS CONVENTION, 25-33 (1987).
183 According to Article 52, the domicile is to be determined by applying the




State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have
arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal
relationship, that court or those courts shall have exclusive juris-
diction. Such an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall be
either:
1) in writing or evidenced in writing; or
2) in a form which accords with practices which the parties
have established between themselves; or
3) in international trade or commerce, in a form which ac-
cords with a usage of which the parties are or ought to have
been aware and which in such trade or commerce is widely
known to, and regularly observed by, parties to a contract
of the type involved in the particular trade or commerce
concerned.
184
Article 17 authorizes parties to agree upon jurisdiction
clauses. A valid agreement on jurisdiction confers exclusive ju-
risdiction on the chosen court.'8 5 Article 17 does not restrict
the places where suit can be filed. It only specifies certain for-
mal requirements that have to be satisfied in order to make the
agreement valid. 186 The approach of Article 17 thus differs from
the international conventions discussed above and from Senate
COGSA'99 where no formal requirements are specified.
Article 17, however, is not applicable to the following con-
sumer 187 contracts:' 88 (1) contracts for the sale of goods on in-
stallment credit terms, (2) contracts for a loan repayable by
installment, and (3) contracts for the supply of goods or services
if in the State of the consumer's domicile the conclusion of the
contract was preceded by specific invitation addressed to him or
by advertising, and the consumer took in that state the steps
necessary for the conclusion of the contract.189 With respect to
these contracts, the consumer may sue either in the courts of
the state in which he is domiciled or in the courts of the state in
184 See PETER STONE, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGEMENTS IN EUROPE 115-16
(1998).
185 STONE, supra note 186, at 125; see also Yvonne Baatz, The Jurisdiction Of The
English Courts To Determine Cargo Claims Under The Lugano Convention, in NEW CAR-
RIAGE OF GOODs By SEA: THE NoRDIc APPROACH INCLUDING COMPARISONS WITH
SOME OTHER JURISDICTIONS 283, 288. (1997).
186 A jurisdiction clause is only valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of
Article 17, Case 24/76, Estasis Salotti di Colzani Amio v. Ruewa 1976 E.C.R. 1831.
187 A consumer is defined in Article 13 as a person that "has concluded a con-
tract for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profes-
sion." Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction, supra note 182, at 1421.
188 Article 17 (3) in conjunction with Article 15. Id. at 1422-23
189 Article 13 (1). Id. at 1421.
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which the other party is domiciled. The other party, however,
may only sue in the courts of the State where the consumer is
domiciled. The consumer can waive his right only after the dis-
pute has arisen. The objective of these provisions was "to pro-
tect consumers, who are taken to be in a weaker bargaining
position than the commercial undertaking with whom they
deal."'9
b. Forum selection clauses in form passenger contracts
Article 17 is applicable to maritime contracts as well. How-
ever, it should be mentioned that according to Article 57, "the
Convention shall be without prejudice to any convention to
which the Contracting States are or will be parties, governing
jurisdiction."'' International conventions in transportation law
that contain jurisdictional provisions like the Warsaw Conven-
tion therefore prevail.9 2 But in maritime law, most countries in
the European Union have ratified neither the Hamburg Rules
nor the Athens Convention. Therefore, Article 17 is still rele-
vant in maritime law.
With respect to form passenger contracts, the law according
to the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction is not totally clear.
On one hand, Article 13 (3) precludes the application of the
consumer protection provisions of the Convention to contracts
for transportation.9 3 But on the other hand, commentators
have concluded that a cruise contract must be characterized as a
contract for the supply of services and not as a contract of trans-
portation because the service elements of such a contract are
more important."9 4 It seems probable that a court would apply
190 Convention Of The Accession to the 1968 Convention of Denmark, The
Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, reprinted in DASHWOOD, supra note
184, at 110; see also STONE, supra note 186, at 83.
191 STONE, supra note 184, at 16.
192 See Schlosser Report 1979 OJ. (C.59/140) (explaining that where a special
convention contains no provision directly governing jurisdiction, the jurisdiction
provisions of the 1968 Convention apply; where all the Contracting States are
parties to a special convention containing provisions on jurisdiction, like the War-
saw Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international car-
riage by air, those provisions prevail).
193 The reason stated in the Schlosser-Report for leaving contracts of transport
out of the scope of the special consumer protection provisions in the 1968 Con-
vention is that such contracts are subject under international agreements to spe-
cial sets of rules with very considerable ramifications. Id. at 119.
194 Eric Jayme, U.S. Supreme Court: Zur Wirksamkeit grenziiberschreitender Gerichtss-
tandsklauseln in Verbrauchervertragen, IPRAx 1993, 42, 43; Karsten Thorn, Verbrauch-
sgerichtsstand nach EuGVU und rtliche Zustdndigkeit, IPRAx 1994, 426, 426.
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the provisions concerning consumer contracts to cruise con-
tracts and, therefore, would prohibit jurisdiction agreements in
advance. It is important to emphasize, however, that consumers
are only protected when the contract was solicited in the State of
the consumer's domicile and the contract was concluded there.
But that would surely cover a case like Effron.
c. Forum selection clauses in bills of lading
With respect to bills of lading, Article 17 (1) (c) is of crucial
importance. Article 17 (1) (c) was added to the Convention in
1979 as a reaction to several decisions of the European Court of
Justice holding that written confirmation of the inclusion of a
jurisdiction clause is necessary before such a clause becomes ef-
fective.' 95 Ruling on jurisdiction clauses in a standardized bill of
lading, the European Court of Justice held that "a jurisdiction
clause was an agreement in writing or an oral agreement evi-
denced in writing1 96 for the purpose of Article 17 if either the
agreement of the parties to the bill of lading had been ex-
pressed in writing; or if the clause had been orally agreed by the
parties before its incorporation in the bill so that the bill of lad-
ing signed by the carrier constituted confirmation in writing of
that agreement; or if the bill was part of a continuing business
relationship between the parties which was itself governed by
general conditions including the jurisdiction clause. 197 Such a
procedure, however, is unusual with respect to the issuance of
bills of lading, which are often "issued after the contract has
been concluded between the shipper and the carrier without
any specific mention of jurisdiction having been made". 19
Article 17 (c) was adopted to facilitate international trade'99
Article 17 (c) reduces the formal requirements that have to be
195 See Schlosser Report, 1979 O.J. (C 59/124).
196 See Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction at art. 17 (1) (a), supra note 184, at
1422.
197 Case C-71/83, Russ/Nova, 1984 E.C.R. 2417.
198 Baatz, supra note 187, at 291.
199 The Schlosser Report explained that the Court's interpretation of Article
17 did not cater adequately for the customs and requirements of international
trade. International trade is heavily dependent on standard conditions that in-
corporate jurisdiction clauses. Nor are those conditions in many cases unilater-
ally dictated by one set of interests in the market; they have frequently been
negotiated by representatives of the various interests. Owing to the need for cal-
culations based on constantly fluctuating market prices, it has to be possible to
conclude contracts swiftly by means of a confirmation of order incorporating sets
of conditions. See Schlosser Report, 1979 O.J. (C 59/125).
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satisfied when the jurisdiction clause is made between parties in
international trade or commerce. In this case, it is enough that
the agreement was made in a form that accords with a usage of
which the parties are or ought to have been aware and which in
such trade or commerce is widely known to, and regularly ob-
served by, parties to a contract of the type involved in the partic-
ular trade or commerce concerned. A usage exists in a branch
of trade or commerce when a particular course of conduct is
generally and regularly followed by operators in that branch
when concluding contracts of a particular type. 20 0 According to
most commentators, the one-sided issuance of bills of lading is
acceptable pursuant to Article 17 (1) (c). Such a jurisdiction
clause is then valid not only between the carrier and the shipper
but also between the carrier and the consignee. 20 1
2. Jurisdiction Clauses In German Law
In contrast to the current U.S. approach, the law in some Eu-
ropean countries2° 2 is reluctant to enforce forum selection
clauses. The law of Germany is an example.
a. The Basic Rules Concerning Forum Selection Clauses
In Germany, the general rules describing the requirements
under which a forum selection clause is valid, are provided by
§ 38 ZPO. 2°3 The law distinguishes between three situations.
The first situation occurs when both parties are residents of Ger-
many, or are domiciled or have their place of business in Ger-
many. In this situation, only merchants, 204 juridical persons of
public law, or separate estates created under public law can
200 Case 106/95, MSG Mainschiffahrts-Genossenschaft v. Les Gravieres
Rhenanes, 1997 E.C.R. 1-911.
201 The European Court ofJustice has ruled that "if the jurisdiction clause was
effective as between the carrier and the shipper, it was also effective between the
carrier and the holder of the bill of lading provided that, under the relevant
national law, the holder of the bill of lading succeeded to the shipper's rights and
obligations under it." Case 71/83, Russ v. Nova, 1984 E.C.R. 2417.
202 Like German law, French and Swiss law does not enforce forum selection
clauses against consumers. See PARK, supra note 184, at 151-156.
203 The ZPO is the German Code of Civil Procedure. This article will not dis-
cuss the relationship between § 38 ZPO and Article 17 of the Brussels Conven-
tion. But where the Brussels Convention applies, Article 17 of the Brussels
Convention enjoys priority.
204 The term "merchant" is defined in the Commercial Code (HGB) as a per-




agree upon a forum selection clause. 20 5 The second situation
occurs when one party is not a resident of or domiciled in Ger-
many or does not have his/her principal place of business in
Germany. In this case, a forum selection clause is valid, if cer-
tain requirements are fulfilled.2 °6 The agreement has to be ei-
ther in writing or, if the parties agreed orally, must be
acknowledged in writing. The third situation occurs when none
of the parties is domiciled or resident or has their principal
place of business in Germany. In this case, the parties are not
restricted from entering into a forum selection agreement. Sec-
tion 38 ZPO, in short, permits pre-dispute jurisdiction agree-
ments only if they have been concluded either by merchants or
between parties, where at least one party is neither a resident of
Germany nor domiciled in Germany nor has a place of business
in Germany.
b. Forum selection clauses in bills of lading
Section 38 ZPO applies to maritime contracts so long as no
special provisions apply. Germany ratified the Hague Rules and
implemented them into the German Commercial Code in
1937.207 The Visby-Amendments and the Hamburg Rules have
not been ratified by Germany. 2°8 Nevertheless, the Visby
Amendments have been incorporated entirely into German
Law.20 9 Because neither the Hague Rules nor the Visby Amend-
ments contain provisions concerning jurisdiction clauses, § 38
ZPO applies with respect to contracts of carriage. Therefore, a
jurisdiction clause between a German party and a party not
domiciled or a resident or who does not have his/her principal
place of business in Germany is valid, but only if it is either in
205 § 38(1) ZPO.
206 § 38(2) ZPO.
207 Seefrachtgesetz v. 10.8.1937 (RGBI. I. S891); see also, Tetley, supra note 135,
at 608.
208 The Hamburg Rules have been strongly opposed by German ship owners
and cargo insurers. See Rolf Herber, German Law On The Carriage Of Goods By Sea,
in NEW CARRIAGE OF GOODS By SEA: THE NORDIC APPROACH INCLUDING COMPARI-
SONS WITH SOME OTHER JURISDICTIONS 346 (1997).
209 2. SAG v. 25.7. 1986, (BGBI. 1. S1120). The German Government intended
to modernize the law of carriage of goods, but reportedly "did not want to give
the impression to other states which had taken part in the Hamburg Conference
that Germany had finally given up hope of further improvement in the standard
of liability with respect to carriage of goods by sea." Id.; see also Herber, supra note
208, at 346.
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writing or, if the parties agreed orally, was acknowledged in
writing.
c. Forum selection clauses in form passenger contracts
With respect to passenger contracts, Germany has not ratified
the Athens Convention so far,210 but has implemented parts of
the Convention into its national maritime law.211 Article 17 of
the Athens Convention is incorporated only in part. The rele-
vant provision 212 designates as a proper forum, the court of the
place of departure or that of the destination, according to the
contract of carriage. A provision that restricts these two fora is
null and void. 213 To this extent, Article 17 (1) (b) and Article 18
of the Athens Convention have been adopted. The other op-
tions for the claimant in Article 17 (1) have not become part of
German law. According to the legislative materials,21 4 the inten-
tion of the German legislature was to ensure that, where Ger-
man law is applicable, a claimant has the possibility to file suit in
a German court. Because a provision in German international
private law assures that German law always applies to cruise con-
tracts, 21 the Court of the place of departure and destination is,
210 Germany has not ratified the Athens Convention because the limitations of
liability have been regarded as too low. Germany has therefore implemented its
own, higher liability limitations. (In case of death or personal injury, the limit is
DM 320,000). The Scandinavian countries and Germany have urged increasing
the limits in the Athens Convention as well. In 1990, International Maritime Or-
ganziation (IMO) adopted a protocol to the Athens Convention, which raises the
liability limits. It is expected that the Convention will be ratified by Germany in
the near future, so long as IMO and CMI do not realize their new plans to amend
the Convention, See Herber, supra note 208, at 346.
211 2. SAG v. 25.7. 1986 (BGBI. I. S1120). The Athens Convention is imple-
mented as an appendix to § 664 HGB to which § 664 refers.
212 § 664 app. art. 14 HGB.
213 § 664 app. art. 15 HGB.
214 BT-Drs. 10/5539/ p. 25; see alsojfirgen Basedow, Kollisionsrechtliche Aspekte
der Seerechtsreform von 1986, IPRAx 87, 333, 341.
215 Whether German law is applicable with respect to a contract is defined in
Articles 27 - 29 EGBGB, the statute dealing with international private law/con-
flicts of law. Accordingly, the parties have the freedom to choose the applicable
law See (art. 27(1) EGBGB (A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the
parties). This rule however, is restricted with respect to certain consumer con-
tracts. art. 29(1) states in the relevant parts:
For a contract the object of which is the supply of ... services for a
purpose which can be regarded as being outside the business or
profession of the recipient (consumer) ... a choice of law made by
the parties shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of
the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law of
the state in which he has his habitual residence: if in that state the
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at least with respect to cruise contracts, always a proper forum,
and this right cannot be waived by the passenger.
IV. HOW U.S. MARITIME LAW SHOULD DEAL WITH
FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
After examining jurisdiction provisions in international con-
ventions, and in European and German law, concerning trans-
portation law, a final evaluation of the current U.S. law and U.S.
Senate COGSA '99 with respect to forum selection clauses can
be made.
A. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN PASSENGER CONTRACTS
With respect to forum selection clauses in passenger con-
tracts, the conclusion can be drawn that none of the examined
regimes allow a choice of forum clause in form passenger con-
tracts and, at the same time, prohibit such agreements in bills of
lading. This, however, would be the situation in the United
States, if Senate COGSA '99 becomes law without adopting a
similar provision for form passenger contracts. U.S. law does
not currently make a distinction between consumers and busi-
nessmen with respect to the enforceability of forum selection
clauses as is the case in European jurisdictions. It should, how-
ever, be noted that it seems inappropriate to give more protec-
tion to businessmen than to consumers.
According to European and German law, jurisdiction agree-
ments are generally prohibited in consumer contracts. This re-
flects a general perception that consumers should be protected.
On an international level, modern international conventions in
transportation law like the new Montreal Convention and the
Athens Convention reflect the idea of consumer protection by
giving passengers non-waivable rights to pursue claims in speci-
fied fora the most important of which is the court of their domi-
cile or permanent residence. These conventions thus effectively
nullify exclusive forum selection agreements.
conclusion of the contract was preceded by a specific invitation ad-
dressed to him by advertising, and he had taken in that state all the
steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of the contract.
§ 29 EGBGB.
According to Article 29(2) a consumer contract shall be governed by the law of
the state in which the consumer has his habitual residence if it is entered into in
the circumstances described in paragraph 1. art. 29 (4) excludes contracts of
carriage from the provisions of Article 29, but not if it is a travel contract that, for
an inclusive price, provides for a combination of travel and accommodation. Id.
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In the United States, only with respect to transportation by air
it is the accepted solution that passengers should have the op-
tion to sue in their home jurisdiction. But there is no reason
that justifies a different view regarding transportation by sea.
Because it is not likely at the moment that the United States will
join the Athens Convention or that a "Warsaw Convention" for
the transportation of passengers by sea will enter into force in
the near future,216 the United States should implement legisla-
tion that protects passengers at least from exclusive forum selec-
tion clauses designating a foreign forum. This would bring
maritime law in accordance with aviation law. Such protection
is especially justified when the contract was solicited and con-
cluded in the United States.2 17
Whether protection of passengers is adequate with respect to
exclusive forum selection clauses designating a forum inside the
United States is less clear. Here again, there seems to be no
persuasive reason why passengers by sea should be treated dif-
ferently from passengers by air. The question arises, however, if
a U.S. airline were to adopt a forum selection clause limiting
U.S. domestic passengers to suit in, say Atlanta, would that
clause be valid and enforceable under Carnival Cruise 218
B. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN BILLS OF LADING
Senate COGSA '99 basically adopts Article 21 of the Hamburg
Rules. Because the Hague Rules left the issue of whether forum
selection clauses are enforceable to national law,219 the adoption
of Article 21 may be achieved without denouncing the Hague
Rules. The crucial question of course is whether the adoption
of Article 21 is a proper solution.
Putting aside the special interests of U.S. maritime lawyers,
who presumably want as much litigation as possible take place in
the United States,22 ° Senate COGSA '99 may reflect the fact that
the United States is no longer a significant maritime carrier
216 It seems to be, however, that a Warsaw/Montreal 99 system with respect to
the carriage of passengers by sea would make sense. Why should passengers by
sea enjoy less protection than passengers by air?
217 See Art.13 (1), Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction, supra note 184.
218 An increasing number of U.S. commentators have concluded that U.S. law,
like the law in European countries, should protect consumers in general. See e.g.,
PARK, supra note 184.
219 Proposed Amendments, supra note 108, at 657.
220 There is concern that U.S. cargo and defense attorneys will have to look for
other employment See e.g., Davis, supra note 7, at 88.
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country. Rather most of U.S. imports as well as exports are car-
ried on foreign flag vessels.221 The U.S. flag fleet is shrinking
almost to the point of non-existence. It is therefore understand-
able for the United States to want to protect the interests of
cargo owners.
Other countries recently have taken the same step. In 1994,
Finland for example, incorporated provisions based on Article
21 of the Hamburg Rules into the Finnish Maritime Code
(FMC) to protect its consignees.222 According to the bill, the
goal was "to improve the cargo owner's possibilities to bring an
action in a court with a natural connection to the contract of
carriage enhancing the plaintiffs possibilities to get effective en-
forcement of a possible judgment. 223
A provision like § 7 (i) (2) of Senate COGSA '99 protects U.S.
cargo owner interests without damaging the interests of U.S. car-
riers in the short run. So long as foreign countries do not pro-
hibit forum selection clauses, U.S. carriers still can profit from
such clauses. Because the United States is the most important
trading nation in the world, however, it can be expected that
other countries will soon adopt similar legislation to avoid a situ-
ation where all claims arising out of bills of lading will be liti-
gated in the United States. The adoption of Article 21 of the
Hamburg Rules as U.S. law will therefore in the long run more
than likely lead to the worldwide acceptance of Article 21.
Stricter formal requirements to protect cargo owners and
shippers are, however, not advisable. The example of Art 17
(1) (c) of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction demonstrates
that stricter formal requirements are no solution with respect to
bills of lading. The Schlosser Report stated correctly "interna-
tional trade is heavily dependent on standard conditions which
incorporate jurisdiction clauses. ' 224 While stricter formal re-
quirements might be reasonable with respect to consumer con-
tracts, in international trade, such requirements only complicate
doing business.
221 In 1995, less than 150 vessels were flying the American flag. See Kirsten
Boehmann, The Ownership and Control Requirements in U.S. and European Air
and Maritime Law-Policy; Consideration; Comparison, 66J. AIR L. & COMMERCE
689 (2001).
222 Wetterstein, supra note 4, at 321, 331.
223 Wetterstein, supra note 4, at 330.
224 1979 O.J. (C 59/125).
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APPENDIX
COMPARISON OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE HAMBURG RULES AND COGSA '99
Hamburg Rules
(a) The principle place of business
or, the habitual residence of
defendant
(b) The place where the contract
was made provided that the
defendant has there a place of
business, branch, agency
through which the contract was
made.
(c) The port of loading or the port
discharge.
(d) Any additional place desig-
nated for that purpose in the
contract of carriage by sea
COGSA '99
(C) The principal place of business
or, the habitual residence of
defendant is in the U.S.
(D) The place where the contract
was made is in the U.S.
(A) The port of loading or the port
of discharge is, or was intended
to be, in the U.S.
(E) A forum specified for litigation
or arbitration under a provi-
sion in the or other agreement
is in the U.S.
(B) The place where the goods are
received by a carrier or the
place where the goods are
delivered to a person author-
ized to receive them is, or was
intended to be, in the U.S.
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